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TOWARD A PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Haochen Sun ∗

ABSTRACT
As a full-fledged legal tool in property and environmental law, the public trust doctrine
has played an important role in deterring inappropriate exploitation of natural resources
and improving protection of the environment. In this article, I explore the possibility of
introducing the public trust doctrine into copyright law and explain why we need to
expand the use of the public trust doctrine from natural resources to knowledge and
information as informational resources. By and large, I demonstrate that compared with
the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, the public trust doctrine, if introduced
into copyright law, can create more effective and powerful institutional mandates to
invalidate the socially unsound expansion of copyright protection, such as the recent
extension of copyright terms.
Moreover, I propose that we can tap into the public trust doctrine to generate a set of new
legal techniques aimed at enriching copyright adjudication and policy-making discourse.
To this end, I argue that we should use the doctrine to promote the ethical values of
guardianship, responsibility, and community. Embedded in these values, the doctrine, as I
will show, aims to promote and protect the public’s collective rights in knowledge and
information held in public trust for all citizens. Moreover, the doctrine paves a new way
to enforce both the government’s political responsibilities and the copyright holders’
social responsibilities regarding public access to and use of knowledge and information.
Besides, I show how courts could apply the public trust doctrine to create alternative
approaches to weigh the constitutionality of the recent twenty-year extension of copyright
terms and to lay out a new decision for the Google Book Search Project case.
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TOWARD A PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Haochen Sun
Each time you write something and you send it out into
the world and it becomes public, obviously everybody
is free to do with it what he pleases, and this is as it
should be....
Hannah Arendt 1
If his works deliver signs, they have to be deciphered
without his assistance. If he participates in this
deciphering, he speaks. Thus the product of labor is not
inalienable possession, and it can be usurped by the
Other.
Emmanuel Levinas 2

INTRODUCTION
We are facing an unprecedented environmental crisis. Deforestation has been
quickly eating away trees; global warming has been vastly melting away polar ice;
and water pollution has been ghastly depriving of human lives. At the forefront of
our fight against the environmental crisis, the public trust doctrine has played an
important role in deterring inappropriate exploitation of natural resources by
government actors and private investors. By reclaiming the public’s collective
interest in certain essential natural resources, it has reinvigorated the
environmental movement 3 through championing the human values of
“guardianship, responsibility, and community” 4 in our public space or natural
ecosystems.
Meanwhile, we are facing an unprecedented environmental crisis in our cultural
ecosystem. 5 Technological measures have been increasingly used to lock up
1

Remarks to the American Society of Christian Ethics, 1973 (cited in Margaret Canovan,
Introduction, in HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION xx (2nd Ed. 1998)).
2
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 176 (1969).
3
See Erin Ryan, Public Trust & Distrust: Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine
for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 479-80 (2001) (“Environmental activists
widely hailed the emergence of the new public trust as the legal tool that would finally empower
them against powerful private and government interests they believed imperiled natural resources
nationwide”); David Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial
Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 311 (1988).
4
Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998).
5
For explanations of the idea of the cultural ecosystem, see text accompanying infra notes 65-75.
The use of the “environment metaphor” in this article draws on the idea of cultural
environmentalism pioneered by James Boyle. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:
Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L. J. 87 (1997); Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2007); THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND 230-249(2008).
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information; copyright terms have been retroactively extended to pull more works
back into proprietary control; and databases have been given stronger legal
protection in order to fence off public access. Heavily skewed by the copyrightbased conglomerates, 6 the recent broad expansion of copyright protection, to a
large extent, foreshadows the coming of a massive private enclosure of digital
information. 7 Amid this rampant enclosure movement, at stake is our cultural
ecosystem which has been disrupted by the unprecedented expansion of copyright
protection, bringing with it “unpredictable, ugly, dangerous, and possibly
irreparable consequences.” 8
What can we do in order to deal with this crisis? In this article, I propose that we
can tap into the public trust doctrine to generate a set of new legal techniques
aimed at enriching copyright adjudication and policy-making discourse. To this
end, I argue that we should use the doctrine to promote the ethical values of
guardianship, responsibility, and community in the intangible public space, the
sphere of essential importance to human development and communicative actions.
Embedded in these values, the doctrine, as I will show, aims to promote and
protect the public’s collective rights in knowledge and information held in public
trust for all citizens (the informational resources in our cultural ecosystem). To
this end, the doctrine paves a new way to enforce both the government’s political
responsibilities and the copyright holders’ social responsibilities regarding public
access to and use of informational resources in our cultural ecosystem. Hence, the
public trust doctrine in copyright law functions to sustain and enhance the
synergies between the major stakeholders in our cultural ecosystem, namely the
members of the public, copyright holders, the government and courts, in order to
promote a healthy public environment for individual and social development. In
doing so, the doctrine enhances the substantive values of the public interest in free
flow of knowledge and information on the one hand, and promotes the procedural
values of democratizing the making of copyright policies and laws through
engaging more public participation on the other hand.
By and large, the public trust doctrine, as I will show, has the potential to address
a major problem that looms large in the recent discourse on copyright and public
domain. While it is unquestionably important to discuss the nature of the public

6

For discussion about this undemocratic problems in copyright legislative process, see the text
accompanying infra notes 154-161.
7
See e.g. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 33 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999);
PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY? (2003); DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON
WEALTH (2002); CHRISTOPHER MAY, AGLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES? (2000).
8
James Boyle, Environmentalism for the Net, supra note 5, at109.
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domain, 9 it actually becomes more important to think about how we can come up
with effective legal techniques to sustain and enhance the public domain. Indeed,
many commentators and public interest activists are very enthusiastic and hopeful
about the invocation of the Copyright Clause 10 or the First Amendment to counter
and invalidate overly strong protection of copyright. 11 Yet Eldred v. Ashcroft 12
dealt as a direct blow to these approaches. The Supreme Court adamantly denied
the claim that either the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment was a bar to
the recent twenty-year expansion of copyright terms. 13
Against this backdrop, I will demonstrate that the public trust doctrine, if
introduced into copyright law, can become an effective alternative tool to
invalidate the socially unsound expansion of copyright protection, such as the
recent extension of copyright terms. It further functions to revitalize the waning
public interest-oriented tradition in copyright adjudication 14 and policy-making. 15
From this perspective, the public trust doctrine does go beyond the reach of the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. But it by no means follows that the
9

See e.g., Collected Papers on the Public Domain published in 2003 Law and Contemporary
Problems (James Boyle ed.); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating
the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN
INFORMATION LAW 121 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Pamela Samuelson,
Enriching Discourse on Public Domain, 55 DUKE L. J. 783 (2006); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981).
10
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 grants Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
11
See e.g., Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 19002000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2239 (2000) (“The point remains the same: in an age of increasing
‘statutorification’ in intellectual property law, the system needs a counterweight where the
legislative process is skewed. The [Copyright] Clause of the constitution, long dormant, seems the
best candidate.”); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008) (proposing that
copyright law should be subject to the First Amendment scrutiny).
12
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
13
For a comprehensive critique of Eldred’s major arguments, see Haochen Sun, Overcoming the
Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 265, 320-22, 327-28 (2007).
14
Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (“The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’. To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work.”) (citations omitted). Similar conclusions can be found in other cases. See Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994).
15
See H.R. REP. NO. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909) (“The enactment of copyright
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that
the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served
and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods
the exclusive rights to their writings…”).
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doctrine would totally supplant them. Instead, the doctrine, as I will show, acts to
buttress their embedded mandates by channeling a whole new set of concrete
legal techniques into copyright adjudication and policy-making. Put differently,
those legal techniques afforded by the public trust doctrine would effectively
prompt courts to fulfill their judicial responsibilities to champion the cause of the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, and further to avoid rendering
Eldred-type decisions. Moreover, the use of the public trust doctrine as proposed
in this Article would create new ways to increase the public awareness of the
importance of protecting free flow of knowledge and information, and to mobilize
more members of the public to actively engage in policy discourse regarding how
the ownership of knowledge and information should be allocated. 16 This is
because the doctrine has the very potential to show the general public their stake
in our cultural ecosystem as it did in the past to mobilize the environmental
movement by increasing the public awareness of each human being’s stake in the
environmental protection of our natural ecosystem. 17 In this sense, the public
trust doctrine would further buttress the mandates embedded in the First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause by engaging more citizens to participate
directly or indirectly in the making of copyright policies or laws.
On the other hand, the bundle of the conventional doctrines embedded in
copyright law per se is seen as the effective legal tools to prevent stronger
copyright protection from stifling free flow of knowledge and information for
social creativity and innovation. Put differently, it is submitted that copyright law
itself contains adequate safeguard measures to protect and promote the public
interest in free flow of knowledge and information. The fair use doctrine, for
example, gives the public at large the privilege to use works without the relevant
author’s permission and paying royalties. 18 Therefore, the doctrine is hailed as a
legal tool that defines “the contours of the private and public domains of human
expression and in so doing, directly impact our capability for human flourishing.” 19
Yet the recent unprecedented expansion of copyright protection may have
jeopardized the positive role played by the fair use doctrine in promoting free flow of
knowledge and information. Congress has adopted a series of laws, such as the
Millennium Digital Copyright Act, which may have unduly undercut the public’s
conventional privileges of using knowledge and information under the fair use
doctrine. 20 Moreover, many courts have interpreted the fair use doctrine based on the
individualistic vision of property rights and thereby turned a blind eye to the larger
16

For the discussion on the importance of engaging more public participation in shaping and
reshaping intellectual property laws, see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization
and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008).
17
See e.g., David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 711, 732-33 (“The Public
Trust Doctrine is a forerunner of the movement to guarantee certain environmental rights as
fundamental human rights.”).
18
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
19
Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes? Evidence From the
Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 517, 522 (2008).
20
See the text accompanying infra notes 76154-78, 93-95161.

6

public interest in free flow of knowledge and information. 21 The combination of
the legislative and judicial expansions of copyright protection, therefore, has
made the fair use doctrine “an exceedingly feeble, inconsistent check on copyright
holders’ proprietary control.” 22
Against this backdrop, the public trust doctrine will provide us with a vantage
point to rethink the nature and scope of many conventional copyright doctrines
designed to ensure the freedom of knowledge and information for both individual
and social development. On the one hand, the doctrine, as I will argue, would lead
us to broaden our vision of the public interest in knowledge and information by
regarding fair use of works as the public’s collective rights. On the other hand, I
will further argue that the public trust doctrine would lead us to rethink the social
responsibilities that should be imposed upon copyright holders. From this
perspective, the fair use doctrine imposes upon copyright holders a set of social
responsibilities that require them to engage themselves in promoting the larger
project of improving the cultural ecosystem of our public space. Through seeing
fair use as the public’s collective rights and copyright holders’ social
responsibilities, the use of the public trust doctrine in copyright law would offer a
creative and dynamic interpretation of the nature and scope of the fair use
doctrine, and further immensely help copyright law to deliver its promise to serve
as the “engine of free expression.” 23

The initial Part of this Article reconsiders the social foundation of the public trust
doctrine. It argues that the doctrine plays an important role in sustaining and
improving the dynamics of our public space, which is essential to human
development and flourishing. Drawing on the social foundation of the doctrine,
Part II discusses how and why the doctrine should be introduced into copyright
law. By combining the conclusions drawn in the preceding two Parts, Part III
further delves into the legal foundation of the public trust doctrine. It explains in
detail how the set of new legal techniques afforded by the doctrine are founded on
the combination of the three agendas aimed at defending the public’s collective
rights, enforcing the government’s political responsibilities, and requiring
copyright holders to fulfill their social responsibilities respectively. The fourth
Part seeks to apply the doctrine to overturn Eldred and to lay out a new decision
for the Google Book Search Project case.

21

See the text accompanying infra notes 89-90, 127-143. See also, NETANEL, supra note 11, at 6266 (discussing the Blackstonian property-centered view of fair use that has been widely used by
courts); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545 (2004) (explaining why wide use of the notion of
transformative use in fair use cases can in turn cause serious free speech problems).
22
NETANEL, supra note 11, at 63.
23
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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I. REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine has a long and venerable history. Generally speaking, it
stemmed from Roman law concepts of public property, which prescribed that the
air, the rivers, the sea and the seashore were incapable of private ownership.
Rather, they were dedicated to the use of the public. 24 With the rise and
development of free trade in Europe, the idea of the public trust was invoked by
those against king’s and feudal lords’ manipulative control of certain natural
resources essential to the commercial manufacture and trade of products in the
marketplace. Thereby, the Roman law idea of the public trust gradually took root
in many common law and civil law jurisdictions in Europe. 25
American law adopted the modern version of the public trust doctrine after its
debut in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 26 a decision rendered by the
Supreme Court in 1892. In Illinois Central, the Court invalidated Illinois state
government’s privatization of the navigable waters of Lake Michigan and land
underneath them. Because these resources were regarded as being “held in trust
for the people of [Illinois],” the public “may enjoy the navigation of the waters,
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties. 27 Therefore, the Court ruled that the
government could not grant any private parties a proprietary control over those
resources, which would in turn exclude the public at large from having free and
unimpeded access to and use of them.
With the rise of modern environmental movement in the early 1960s, Joseph Sax
revitalized the public trust doctrine by imbuing it with new substantive and
procedural underpinnings. He argued that in terms of the substantive value, the
public trust doctrine should not restrict itself to its conventional role in protecting
the right of navigation, commerce and fishing. Rather, the doctrine could further
act as a powerful legal tool for people to protect their right to sustainable
protection of the environment. 28 With regard to the procedural value, he put
24

THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. 2, tit. 1, pts. 1-6, at 65 (J. Thomas trans. 1975) (“By the law
of nature these things are common to mankind – the air, running water, the sea, and consequently
the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he
respects habitations, monuments, and buildings which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law
of nations.”).
25
For example, in England, the public trust doctrine was recodified in the Magna Carta and forced
upon King John in 1225 after his defeat at the battle of Runnymede. The treaty stipulated that
neither he nor any future king could grant private hunting and fishing rights to favored earls and
dukes, thereby cutting off the commons from people who relied upon them for their livelihood.
By the eleventh century a French law had been decreed which said that “the public highways and
byways, running water and springs, meadows and pastures, forests, heaths and rocks are not to be
held by Lords; nor are they to be maintained in any other ways than that their people may always
be able to use them.” See MARC BLOCH ET AL, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183 (1966).
26
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
27
Id. at 452.
28
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478-89 (1970).
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forward a proposal that the public trust doctrine empowers courts to act on
citizens’ behalf to override unreasonable privatization of natural resources carried
out by government. 29 This is because the democratic process of governing use of
natural resources is vulnerable to lobbying efforts made by the relevant interest
groups. From this perspective, Sax proposed that in order to deliver its substantive
and procedural promises, the modern public trust doctrine must be imbued with
three interrelated standards of review: (1) “contain[ing] some concept of a legal
right in the general public;” (2) “be[ing] enforceable against the government;” and
(3) “be[ing] capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns
for environmental quality.” 30 With the surge of the environmental movement,
Sax’s theory of the public trust doctrine has provided a legal cause of action for
public interest activists and citizens at large to prevent or stop environmental
harm caused to certain natural resources. Despite criticisms, 31 the doctrine per se
has been at the forefront of state common law developments aimed at protecting
natural resources as public property. Meanwhile, the legal status of the doctrine
has been formally recognized in many state constitutions and environmental
laws. 32
Drawing on the lessons gleaned from a rich array of judicial opinions and
scholarly discussions, I will explore in this Part the social foundation of the public
trust doctrine, which would lay the ground for introducing the doctrine into
copyright law. I will argue that we can re-conceptualize the role of the public trust
doctrine beyond the conventional wisdoms by considering its social foundation
from the perspective of the philosophical theory of the public space.
A. Public Space as the Foundation of Human Development
By and large, having a private space is of essential importance for every human
being to achieve self-development and flourishing. The private space that belongs
exclusively to a particular person draws up the boundaries of the sphere, such as
walls, fences, doors and so on. In this way, it affords the bounded sphere in
which we are left free to choose the ways of satisfying our own desires and
inclinations without undesirable interventions from others. Thus, in our own
private spaces we remain free to design the contents of private life of being as
individuals, including enjoying happiness and peace, and even living through
loneliness or sorrow. From this perspective, the institution of private property is
designed to protect personal freedom within the boundaries of the private space.
29

Id. at 491-565
Id. at 474.
31
See e.g. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986).
32
For example, the Pennsylvania State Constitution provides that “public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefits of all the people.”
PA. CONST. art I. §27. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing
Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006); Matthew Thor Kirsch,
Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 Duke L.J. 1169 (1997).
30
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Hegel, albeit seen as the inspirational figure for the modern communitarianism,
insightfully observed that the premise of legal protection of private property in
human society lies in the fact “[t]he person must give himself an external sphere
of freedom in order to have being as Idea.” 33
Yet having the private space is not necessarily the only condition on which human
beings achieve self-development and flourishing. The trajectory of the human
development and flourishing, in fact, constantly entails the direct or indirect
influence from others, be they known or unknown human beings. For example,
our being able to speak a language as one of the basic human capabilities is
acquired through numerous encounters and interactions with others. Although
parents surely play an important role in nurturing our linguistic capabilities in the
family setting, we sustain and enhance them through speaking with and listening
to people we meet on various occasions. Furthermore, our exposure to the general
cultural environment improves our linguistic capabilities, because it provides us
with the multitude of key ingredients of communal norms which govern the ways
in which people speak. They primarily include customs, traditions, and so on, and
are by nature collectively shaped by the people who live in the same community.
Therefore, the role of “others” in human development, be it direct or indirect,
shows that human action and speech, as Hannah Arendt observed, are “never
possible in isolation” and “need the surrounding presence of others”. 34
In addition to the “human” other, we also need non-human objects as the “other”
for our development and flourishing. Things like houses, beds, clothes and so on,
form the exclusive external spheres that are essential to our life in the private
space. Meanwhile, there are non-human objects which constitute the
indispensable “other” outside the boundaries of the private spaces. On the one
hand, we can find our presence, be it constant or sporadic, in the non-human
“other” which is not made by men. We go boating in the river, hiking in the
mountain, and picnicking in the forest. In our eyes, these things, the non-manmade “other”, form the natural environment to which we belong. 35 On the other
hand, we can find our presence in the “other” which is made collectively by our
fellow human beings. We speak loudly in the town square, drive fast on the
highway, and play happily in the park. These venues, the man-made “other”, form
the social environment in which we are nurtured. Regardless of being man-made
or not, all these thing-hood others create the environment that lies outside the
boundaries of our private spaces. 36
33

G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 41 (trans. H. B. Nisbet, 1991).
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 188 (2nd Ed. 1998). Arendt also points out that
“action and speech are surrounded by and in contact with the web of the acts and words of other
men.”
35
JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 3 (2007) (“The
stillness of a remote forest lake or the imposing crags of a mountain peak provide for many both a
sense of connection to a larger world and a sense of inner wonder.”).
36
Mead uses the language process as an example to demonstrate that the self “arises in the process
of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
34
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The otherness of human development, 37 as discussed above, makes it impossible
for any of us to live only within the closed boundaries of our won private spaces.
Rather, because the “other” always physically exists outside of the private space,
one’s coming to the “other” requires him to situate himself in the place where he
and the “other” can meet each other, though the distance between them is not sure
(sometimes face to face, sometimes not). Such arena is the public place where
only open boundaries exit.
The openness of the public place which accommodates “me” and “others” has two
core attributes: publicity and commonality. On the one hand, the public space is
the open arena where “everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by
everybody and has the widest possible publicity.” 38 On the other hand, the public
space is the open arena where people have things together in common and these
things ought not to be held in exclusive possession by any single person. 39
Therefore, the public space affords people the sphere in which they can meet and
act together to achieve social or political goals and to further set up norms that
govern human interactions in the society as a whole.
B. Public Space and the Public Trust Doctrine
As shown at the outset of the preceding section, the thrust of the public trust
doctrine is to keep certain natural resources held in trust for the general public as
a whole. These resources are regarded as “inherent public property” 40 and every

relations to that process as a whole and to the other individuals.” GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND,
SELF, & SOCIETY 135 (1967).
37
The phenomenologist account of human development offers the most profound discussion about
the relationship between the self and the other. See e.g., G. W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF
SPIRIT § 178 (A. V. Miller trans. 1977) (“Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by
the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exits only in being acknowledged.”); EMMANUEL
LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 193(Alphonso Lingis trans. 1969)
(“It is the face; its revelation is speech. The relation with the Other alone introduces a dimension
of transcendence, and leads us to the a relation totally different from experience in the sensible
sense of the term, relative and egoist.”). The idea of men as social beings further lends a strong
support to the phenomenologist account of human development. See ARISTOTLE, THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 14 (Penguin, 2004) (“By self-sufficient we mean not what is sufficient for
oneself alone living a solitary life, but something that includes parents, wife and children, friends
and fellow-citizens in general; for man is by nature a social being.”); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 10
(Oxford 1998); Karl Marx, Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in 66 THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 85 (Robert V. Tucker ed. 1978) ( “[T]he human essence of nature first exists only for
social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with man—as his existence for the
other and the other’s existence for him—as the life-element of the human world.”); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 216 (1976) (“[L]ike everything else the self is
defined by the totality of its relations with other beings and, particularly, with other selves.”).
38
ARENDT, supra note 34, at 50. A similar notion of the publicity is offered by Iris Young. See
IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 168-170 (2000).
39
ARENDT, supra note 34, at 52.
40
See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
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member of the public has free and unimpeded access and use of them. The public
ownership vested in the general public makes the boundaries of the public trust
resources constantly open to everyone on equal terms. Therefore, the public trust
doctrine is by nature designed to maintain the public openness of the protected
resources to every member of the public, and to prevent them from being
privatized and equipped with closed boundaries by any potential private parties.
As I will show below, there are, however, a variety of manipulative activities
performed by either government or private parties, which result in the degrading
of the openness of the public space. In this context, the public trust doctrine plays
an important role in countering those manipulations and thereby protecting the
openness of the public space that is of essential importance for human
development and flourishing as shown in the preceding section.
1. Against the Ecological Manipulation
First and foremost, the public trust doctrine has been evoked as a powerful legal
tool for combating the manipulative activities that cause the ecological
deteriorating of the natural environment. It has been long recognized that the
natural environment is formed by interconnected ecosystems as the networks of
biota that mutually support one other. Each part of the natural environment is
interdependent and can not be reduced into disparate bits and pieces. 41 The
deterioration of the environment, by and large, results from human activities that
make undesirable alterations to the integrity of the environment. They are
routinely performed by people in order to exploit a particular part of natural
resources without paying any sufficient heed to the negative impacts on the
environment in its entirety.
Against this backdrop, the public trust doctrine functions to protect and preserve
the natural environment by providing safeguards against the “destabilizing
changes” 42 to natural resources as the public space for the general public. In doing
so, it requires every member of the public to follow the “land ethic” that is based
upon the notion that “[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends
otherwise.” 43 The doctrine, therefore, holds that “conservation of resources is
intrinsically good and necessary for the continuation of society.” 44 By ruling out
any unreasonable alterations to public trust natural resources, the doctrine
recognizes and embraces the intrinsic values of maintaining the openness of the
41

See e.g., Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
875, 883 (1994) (“Our history … has taught us that activities in one part of the landscape greatly
influence other parts.”).
42
Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L.REV. 185, 188 (1980) (“The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing
disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title. The
function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public expectations against
destabilizing changes, just as we protect conventional private property from such changes.”).
43
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 224-25 (1968).
44
W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (1998).
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natural environment. From this perspective, the California Supreme Court, for
example, placed much emphasis on the practice of conservation through keeping
the tidelands open for all:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public
uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect
45
the scenery and climate of the area.

Generally speaking, the manipulative activities that have been invalidated by the
public trust doctrine fall into two categories. First, the doctrine has been invoked
to flight unreasonable diversion of natural resources. For example, the California
Supreme Court forbade the water department in Los Angeles to unreasonably
divert water from the rivers feeding Mono Lake on the ground that the vast
diverting of water had severely caused degrading of the lake’s scenic beauty and
ecological values. 46 Given that the lake waters are held in public trust for all the
citizens in California, the state as the trustee of the water resources was deemed to
have failed to “preven[t] any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate
water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.” 47
On the other hand, the doctrine has been invoked to regulate or prohibit activities
that cause pollution to natural resources. For example, acting as the trustee of the
natural resources concerned, the State of Idaho required a company to make a
million-dollar restoration effort to remove oil sheen leaked in Idaho’s St. Joe
River. 48 Moreover, courts have also used the doctrine to help the government or
people to recover damages they sustained due to the pollution of public trust
natural resources. 49
2. Against the Economic Manipulation
The rhetoric of the tragedy of the commons teaches that privatization is a panacea
for overuse or depletion of natural resources for the public.50 Moreover, given the
45

Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60 (1971) (emphases added).
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 424-25 (Cal.,1983) (“As a result
of these diversions, the level of the lake has dropped; the surface area has diminished by one-third;
one of the two principal islands in the lake has become a peninsula, exposing the gull rookery
there to coyotes and other predators and causing the gulls to abandon the former island. The
ultimate effect of continued diversions is a matter of intense dispute, but there seems little doubt
that both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled.”).
47
Id. at 445.
48
See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 1067 (2004).
49
See e.g., In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (1980).
50
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE (1968). Aristotle may be the
first person to come up with this idea. For example, he pointed that “[they devote a very small
fraction of time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own
46
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heightened difficulty in reaching agreement due to the increased transaction costs
when the number of parties increases, the theory of collective action further adds
the rhetorical basis for making privatization as a means to the ends of optimal use
of natural resources. 51 The economic justification for privatizing natural resources,
therefore, centers on the need to allocate exclusive control over resources to those
who can make optimal use and management. It further highlights the role of free
market in bringing about maximization of wealth for personal and social
development. 52
Yet privatization through the invisible hand of mere privatization and free market
begs the question why certain natural resources, such as the Mississippi River and
the Central Park in the New York City, ought to be held in public trust and are not
susceptible of private ownership. The rationale against expansive privatization of
natural resources, by and large, stems from the fact the free market, albeit its
liberty-promoting function, breeds coercions by creating monopolization of
resources. In the modern society, it is inevitable for every person to get involved
in the trade that takes places in the marketplace. While every person has the equal
status as a trading participant in the marketplace, the type or amount of resources
held in their control in fact differs from one another. Therefore, the bargaining
power they have for negotiating deals in the marketplace always varies from
person to person. Due to the unequal distribution of bargaining power, some
people with stronger bargaining power can coerce others into following their
commands, should the latter need anything from the former. 53 Although the latter
may turn around to seek another party to trade, the inequality of distribution of
bargaining powers would still lead them to negotiate with those with stronger
bargaining power, resulting in their being subjected to coercion again.
From the bargaining-power perspective, an expansive privatization of natural
resources would bring out the problem that the private owner may exert coercion
on members of the public. On the one hand, by relying on the right to exclude, a
private owner may prevent the public from exercising their public trust rights,
such as walking across the private beach for fishing, bathing or swimming in the
sea, and walking along privately-owned lake shore to relax. 54 Under this
circumstance, the private ownership of public trust resources is the shield against
objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come to his neglect, that it is the business of
somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by
all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1261b (1885).
51
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 125-28 (1971) (arguing that
large-group organization is ineffective where the benefits are collective because of free riding).
52
See eg., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-34 (6th ed. 2003); Harold
Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 347 (1967).
53
See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 470 (1923).
54
Town of Orange v Resnick, 94 Conn 573, 578; 109 A 864 (1920) (listing as public rights
“fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish, gathering seaweed, cutting sedge and . . .
passing and repassing”).
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the public’s access to or use of the resources. It signals that unauthorized use of
the resources concerned would result in legal penalties, should the owner asserts
his rights before courts. For fear of the potential legal penalties, many members of
the public may opt out of exercising their public trust rights. Against this
backdrop, the private owner simply coerces the public by using their bargain
power to exclude. The public trust doctrine has been invoked by the court to stop
the use of coercive power in this kind of case. For example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that the public are legally to have unimpeded access to and
make reasonable use of the privately-owned dry sand beaches to use the foreshore
areas for recreational purposes like bathing and swimming. 55
On the other hand, if certain natural sources indispensable to the life of the public
fall into proprietary control, property owners may charge access and use fees that
most members of the public can not afford. Therefore, privatization of certain
natural resources would lead to monopolistic control and abuses. Recognizing the
grave harm that may be caused by monopolization of certain natural resources,
courts repeatedly used the public trust doctrine to prevent navigable waters and
the lands underneath them from being held under proprietary control. These
resources inherently have the public trust status, because they are indispensable
for commercial activities through navigation to take place. 56 The exclusive
control over the navigable waters as the “highways of commerce,”57 would result
in monopolistic price that is prohibitively high for regular navigation activities,
causing an unreasonable increase in social cost of commerce. Therefore, the
public trust doctrine aimed at keeping navigable waters open for all commercial
activities, as the court concluded, “is founded upon the necessity of preserving to
the public the use of navigable waters from private interruption and
encroachment.” 58
3. Against the Cultural Manipulation
Thirdly, the public trust doctrine invalidates the state action in allocating certain
natural resources that would bring about cultural manipulation in the public space.
Human interactions in the public space are of essential importance for human
development. Keeping the public space equally open for all ensures that people
are free to enter into the public space to interact and socialize with others. By
providing the venue for human interactions, the public trust doctrine fosters a
culture of participation through enriching human socialization and promoting
democratic governance.

55

See e.g. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306 (1984).
Rose, supra note 40, at 754.
57
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49(1894) (“[T]he
navigable waters and the soils under them … shall be and remain public highways….”).
58
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 436 (1892). See also, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)
(invalidated exclusive privilege to navigate New York waters with steam vessels).
56
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To enrich human socialization, the public trust doctrine mandates that certain
natural resources should be maintained open for the public to use for the
recreational purpose. These recreational uses permitted and protected by the
doctrine include bathing, swimming, walking and so on. 59 A person’s
participation in these recreational activities in the public space opens the door for
him to mingle himself with others and to exchange his own thoughts and ideas
with them. Moreover, it allows him to relax and improve his physical and mental
well-beings by taking part in those recreational activities with the company of the
known or unknown people in the public space. Being together with others in this
setting may help him to walk out of the potential shadow of isolation and
loneliness, and to have more fun in exercising and playing. By keeping certain
natural resources open for recreational use by the public, the doctrine per se plays
the role of encouraging people to enter into the public space, and thereby further
promotes the culture of participation through facilitating active socialization
among people in the public space. Any private activities that hinder active
socialization in the public space, therefore, would amount to cultural manipulation.
For example, if any private parties prevent members of the public from accessing
the seashore areas to bathe and swim, they would be deemed to have caused
public nuisance. 60
On the other hand, effective democratic governance necessarily entails citizens’
active participation in public discourse on a wide range of social issues. To this
end, the citizens at large must have the freedom to take part in “uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open” 61 debate in the public space. From this perspective, the
public space ought to be kept open for everyone to express their views, to make
suggestions, to exchange information, and to raise doubts. The openness of the
public space, in essence, allows people to perform speech activities in order to
participate in democratic governance. For example, streets and parks are
important venues for people make their speech activities effective in the public
space. Any interventions that dilute the openness of streets and parks as public
spaces, would result in suppressing free speech and thereby amount to cultural
manipulation of the public’s initiative to participating in democratic governance.
Hence courts have invoked the public trust doctrine to make sure that streets and
parks as the public fora for free speech activities are open to all. For example, in
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, the Supreme Court famously stated
that “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
59

For the role of public property in facilitating socialization, see Rose, supra note 40, at 777-781.
Judge Best thought that “the interruption of free access to the sea is a public nuisance…. The
principle of exclusive appropriation must not be carried beyond things capable of improvement by
the industry of man. If it be extended so far as to touch the right of walking over these barren
sands, it will take from the people what is essential to their welfare, whilst it will give to
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268, 275 (K.B.1821), cited in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306
(1984).
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens.” 62

II. RESHAPING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS AN LEGAL TOOL IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
In the preceding Part, I delved into the social foundation of the public trust
doctrine by exploring how and why it plays an important role in deterring
ecological, economic, and cultural manipulations so as to maintain the openness
of a robust public space. The social foundation of the doctrine, as I will discuss in
this Part, lays the bedrock justification for introducing the doctrine into copyright
law. On the one hand, I will first show that the role of copyright law in governing
the openness the (intangible) public space through allocating the ownership of
knowledge and information would necessitate expanding the use of the public
trust doctrine from natural resources to knowledge and information as
informational resources. On the other hand, I will also show that the current
modes of copyright protection have bred ecological, economic and cultural
manipulations, and the public trust doctrine, if introduced into copyright law,
would play a pivotal role in countering these manipulations and thereby further
maintain and enhance the openness of the (intangible) public space. By and large,
I will seek to shed new light on why the public trust doctrine should be introduced
into copyright law and will demonstrate that the court in Eldred v. Reno entirely
erred in ruling that the public trust doctrine should not be extended to copyright
law. 63
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307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). See also, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (“No
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are
held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.”).
63
Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Insofar as the public trust doctrine
applies to navigable waters and not copyrights, the retroactive extension of copyright protection
does not violate the public trust doctrine.”). For discussion about the relationship the public trust
doctrine and copyright law, see Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust
Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647 (2000); Margaret Chon,
Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97,
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not be introduced in copyright law).
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A. (Intangible) Public Space and Copyright Law
As shown in the preceding Part, there are certain natural resources that form the
crucial elements of a dynamic and robust public space. Given that these natural
resources exist in tangible form, they constitute the tangible public space where
people engage themselves physically in the interactions with the other human
beings and non-human objects. While the public space can be comprised of
tangible resources, it can also be formed by resources that exist in intangible form.
These resources are primarily knowledge and information and they constitute
what I call the intangible public space.
In the intangible public space, people use knowledge and information as the
public resources to communicate with one another. Based upon the knowledge
and information they obtain, people talk and write not only about their personal
matters but also the larger economic, cultural, political issues. In this way, people
exchange their understandings of these issues and try to figure out how they
should deal with them. In addition to talking and writing, people also use
knowledge and information in other forms of communicative actions, 64 such as
painting, dancing and so on. These actions performed by the movements of
human body largely reveal people’s inner feelings to the outer world. The
performers of these actions use knowledge and information to dictate and
organize the movements of their human bodies to reveal their inner feelings to the
audiences in the outer world. Given that the performing of all communicative
actions is done in a public setting, it necessarily involves people’s public use of
their reason. 65 To use one’s reason publicly, one first selects the knowledge and
information available in the intangible public space, and then uses it for the
purpose of communicating with one another about their own inner world of
reasoning.
By and large, copyright law plays an important role in regulating the flow of
knowledge and information in the public space. This is because it functions to
regulate communicative actions and the ways in which people can legally make
public use of their reason. By enacting copyright law, the state accords exclusive
ownership on expressions of communicative actions, which include literature, art,
film, artistic, audio/visual performances, television broadcasts and so on.
Meanwhile, it further furnishes legal penalties against infringements of the
exclusive rights over copyrighted expressions. Therefore, it is inevitable that any
64

For Habermas, communicative action plays an essential role in shaping human beings and
human society in the following three ways. “Under the functional aspect of mutual understanding,
communication action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of
coordinating action, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; finally, under
the aspect of socialization, communicative action serves the formation of personal identities.”
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (II) 137 (Thomas McCarthy tran.
1984)
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For the idea of public use of reason, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS
SOCIETY 27 (T. Burger trans. 1989).
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knowledge and information in expressive form, may be subject to copyright
protection.
Given that private ownership inherently carries the power to exclude, copyright
law inevitably acts as a filter that determines the extent to which knowledge and
information would remain free of proprietary control in the intangible public
space. 66 The access to and use of knowledge and information, therefore, is no
longer open and free for the general public in many cases. If one wants to use
knowledge and information available in copyrighted expressions, he or she first
needs to obtain permission from the relevant copyright owner. Therefore, it
necessarily follows that only those who can obtain permission, for example
through paying loyalties, are allowed to do that. By operating copyright protection,
the state, therefore, inevitably makes a series of decisions regarding the
availability of knowledge and information that remains open and free in the public
space for people to use. From this perspective, copyright law by nature functions
to determine the degree of the openness of the intangible public space. Akin to its
role in acting as a check on the state’s power in allocating certain natural
resources, the public trust doctrine could be applied by courts to examine whether
the state has exercised its power of allocating informational resources in an
appropriate and reasonable way. Generally speaking, the public trust doctrine in
copyright law is embodied with the following two basic principles and how they
could be used will be discussed in Part III.
First of all, the public trust doctrine in copyright law mandates that knowledge
and information ought to be held in trust for the general public as informational
resources. Knowledge and information, as shown above, is an essential resource
that empowers people to engage themselves in any communicative actions in the
intangible public space. Accordingly, knowledge and information as
informational resources, akin to certain natural resources such navigable waters,
seashores and so on, are essential to keeping the public space open for all the
people. For example, Jefferson emphatically stated that “Nature clearly wants
ideas to be free! … Like air, ideas are incapable of being locked up and
hoarded.” 67 Similarly, Justice Brandeis’s famous opinion in International News
Service v. Associated Press contains a classic defense of the public ownership
nature of knowledge and information: “The general rule of law is, that the noblest
of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
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NETANEL, supra note 11, at 118 (“Copyright is speech regulation. … [C]opyright is heavily
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Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1569
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become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”
68

On the other hand, the public trust doctrine requires that the government’s action
in allocating the ownership of informational resources through the initiative of
copyright law shall be made only for the protection and promotion of the public
interest. By and large, the government is deemed the trustee of informational
resources flowing in the intangible public space, and therefore is politically
responsible for guaranteeing to “leav[e] no room for a statutory monopoly over
information and ideas.” 69 It is invalid for the government to grant copyright over
informational resources purely for benefiting any private parties. In fact, the forthe-public-interest requirement fully comports with James Madison’s opinion that
copyright is an instance in which “public good fully coincides … with the claims
of individuals.” 70 Moreover, it has been recognized by the courts which
proclaimed that copyrights “are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the
public good.” 71
B. The Public Trust Doctrine and Copyright Law
In the discussion that follows, I will demonstrate that there are ecological,
economic and cultural manipulations caused either by the government who has
the political power to decide the level of copyright protection, or by the private
parties who act as copyright holders having proprietary control over relevant
information resources. The presence of these manipulative activities and the lack
of the effective measures to counter them in the current structure of copyright
protection further make it necessary to introduce the public trust doctrine in
copyright law.
1. The Ecological Manipulation
Akin to the human existence in the natural ecosystem, there is a cultural
ecosystem in which people perform communicative actions based upon public use
of their reason. This is because our public use of reason entails a combination of
two interconnected processes. On the one hand, we need to internalize knowledge
68

248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also, Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads,
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and information into our inner minds to trigger the thinking and reasoning
abilities. To be sure, once we enter into the public space, we lead us to the world
of our observing and interacting with others in the public space as well. The
process of observation and interaction generates the necessary knowledge and
information for us to think and reason about matters in the intangible public space.
On the other hand, we also need to externalize the knowledge and information
resulting from our thinking and reasoning power to sustain and enhance our
activities of observing and interacting with others in the public space. Every
moment when we speak, write, or act with other body movements, we all impart
to others the knowledge and information for them to perceive what we think and
reason about. The process of writing, for example, clearly entails the combination
of these two processes. Authors write based upon the knowledge and information
acquired through their experiencing of the environment in which they live. In
particular, they write by drawing on the materials written by others. 72 Moreover,
authors always spend time in writing for the purpose of communicating their
thoughts from inner minds to the external world of people. From this perspective,
writing is also a process of revealing and displaying authors’ inner minds to their
audiences. 73
Therefore, the need for us to keep internalizing and externalizing knowledge and
information makes our communicative actions and public use of reason
inextricably intertwined with those of others’. In this sense, our intangible public
space is by nature an ecosystem in which each of us performs communicative
actions through the cultural exchange of the knowledge and information that
flows in the intangible public space. We cannot divide our cultural ecosystem into
separated bits and pieces. This would in turn result in blocking either our
internalizing or externalizing of knowledge and information when we perform
communicative actions. Akin to the natural ecosystem, 74 keeping the integrity of
our cultural ecosystem therefore has the intrinsic value for each member of the
public. Thus, the ethos of conservation that goes against what Joseph Sax called
“destabilizing changes” to natural resources applies to 75 to informational
resources in our cultural ecosystem.
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It seems that the recent unprecedented expansion of copyright has made a
significantly negative effect on free flow of knowledge and information by
causing serious “destabilizing changes” to our cultural ecosystem. These
developments in copyright protection, as shown below, significantly tighten up
proprietary control over informational resources, making it hard for the public to
use them in order to internalize knowledge and information to perform
communicative actions.
In 1998, Congress adopted the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) to give
another twenty-year extension of copyright terms, prospectively and retroactively.
However, the retroactive extension of copyright terms in particular, has pulled the
works that are already or about to be out of copyright protection back into the
proprietary control. 76 If the extension had not been made, these contents
traditionally recognized as public property,77 would have remained free for the
public to use. They can be seen as quasi ideas and facts not subject to any form of
copyright protection. Moreover, the Millennium Digital Copyright Act (DMCA)
prohibits circumvention of technological measures that are employed by
copyright holders to lock up works in digital form, and further bars manufacture
and distribution of devices capable of circumventing technological measures.
DMCA accords paracopyright 78 to right holders in that it would allow them to
legally lock up any information with technological measures they deploy. Also,
right holders are entitled to control access to their works, making it harder or even
impossible for the public to make fair use of works under many circumstances.
This is because the public can make fair use only when they have free and
unimpeded access to works in the first hand, given that fair use presupposes that
the public at large does not need to obtain permission from, and pay loyalties to,
any copyright holders concerned.
2. The Economic Manipulation
Generally speaking, copyright law confers upon creators the market power to reap
what they sow in the production and dissemination of their works. Therefore, at
the heart of copyright law, lies its promise to protect economic rights as the most
direct and important means of ensuring the monetary returns to creators. 79 Yet
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this model of protection, if not checked by the strong limitations on economic
rights, may result in unbridled exploitation of those who seek for the license to
use the works controlled by copyright holders.
On the one hand, while the public has the privilege to make fair use of works with
no need to obtain permission from pay loyalties to right holders, they may still
end up paying right holders to get the unnecessary licenses. Under many
circumstances, users are not sure whether their uses of works can be deemed fair
by law, because the limitations on copyright such as the fair use doctrine are
usually too vague and indeterminate for them to rely on to make such a
decision. 80 They then become afraid of being sued and a series of grave troubles
they may get themselves plunged into, such as a large amount of time and energy
needed to respond to the litigation and the potential damages and attorney fees
they may need to cover. Faced with this kind of hidden coercion that may be
exerted by the copyright holder, many individuals or entities may simply refrain
from making fair uses of works, 81 and many educational institutions in particular
have already adopted overly restrictive fair use policies. 82
On the other hand, the public at large is also faced with the tangible coercion that
may be exerted by the right holder against them. First, many copyright holders
have routinely exaggerated the scope of their economic rights as a way to prevent
the public from making fair use. For example, the cautionary notice—“No part of
this book can be reproduced without the permission of the publisher”—can be
easily found in almost every book published, be it copyrighted or not. Publishers
also routinely require users in this way: you may quote no more than X number of
words, lines, or paragraphs from the book. 83 Yet it seems that all the publishers
1994), quoted in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). (“[C]opyright law celebrates
the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will
redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.... The profit motive is
the engine that ensures the progress of science. ”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (“By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
80
Sun, supra note 13, at 283-91; James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-95 (2007).
81
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545 (2004) (“Even a successful fair use defense is expensive,
and the risk of such a lawsuit deters publishers from investing in potentially infringing works...”).
82
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1694
(1988) (“[A]s almost any college teacher can attest, the information presently being given faculty
by university counsel regarding how much copyrighted material they may reproduce for classroom
use is distinctly unhelpful.”); William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Materials in the Digital Age 85-87
(2006) (listing the “[u]nduly [c]autious [g]atekeepers” of fair use in university settings); Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University Campus, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 297, 313
n.36 (2000) (describing NYU’s adoption of restrictive fair use guidelines after a lawsuit over
copying course materials).
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See STEPHEN FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK: HOW TO PROTECT & USE WRITTEN WORKS
11/8 (8th ed. 2005) (“[A]lthough there is no legally established word limit for fair use, many
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accustomed to using exaggerations of that kind have totally turned a blind eye to
the fair use doctrine that sets up no special limit on the amount users can copy and
in fact allows the public to reproduce portions of or even the entire copy of the
work. 84 Moreover, copyright holders may leverage their economic rights to
impose prohibitively high licensing fees for users. Such practice is still legal
because they charge fee simply in accordance with the business practices they
uses.
The following story epitomizes both the hidden and tangible coercions that
copyright holders especially those big media corporations can exert on the pubic.
Jon Else, a documentary filmmaker, spent almost nine years in raising funds and
producing a non-commercial documentary. Yet Fox News insisted on charging a
licensing fee of $10,000 for him to use “a 4.5-second, out-of-focus, no-sound
background shot” in that documentary. Else was advised that his use of that shot
might be fair use, but he might plunge himself into the trouble of litigation if Fox
News decides to sue him. Because the licensing fee was prohibitively high for
him, he had to cut that shot off from his documentary. 85 Jon Else’s story is not an
isolated case. Rather, many other documentary filmmakers and researchers and
students in educational institutions alike are faced with the same situation. 86
3. The Cultural Manipulation
By furnishing the protection of economic rights, modern copyright law functions
to relieve creators from their financial reliance on the individual or state patronage
which may unduly influence the ways in which they express their own ideas and
opinions. With the securing of their economic independence, creators are
supposed to produce and disseminate works reflective of their own thoughts,
making contribution to the cultural diversity of our society. Yet it is inevitable
that protecting economic rights as the core of copyright law inculcates people
with the notion that literal and artistic creation always involves monetary returns,
and the more works one creates or controls, the more economic benefits one can
reap. From this perspective, copyright law condones or even encourages that
mentality of maximizing economic benefits in producing and disseminating works
of authorship. Against this backdrop, for many corporate entities in particular,
maximizing economic benefits becomes the sole motivation of engaging in or
organizing literary and artistic creations.

publishers act as if there were one and require their authors to obtain permission to quote more
[than] a specified number of words (ranging from 100 to 1,000 words.”).
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Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that verbatim
copying for time-shifting purpose is fair use ); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994) (holding that extensive copying for the purpose of making parody is fair use).
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Yet the ethics of maximizing economic benefits promoted by the current modes of
copyright protection may have caused serious problem of cultural manipulations.
In many circumstances, copying works is crucial for members of the general
public to participate in the cultural life in a society. 87 Activities of this kind are
generally seen as conducive to cultural development and social well-being. For
example, researchers and educators routinely need to copy reasonable portions of
works in order to do research and carry out teaching activities. Music sampling
greatly helps musicians to compose new music. Yet copyright holders especially
those big companies wield strong power to stop members of the public from
copying their works and thereby hamper their cultural participation. As long as
copyright holders deem it necessary to act for the purpose of maximizing their
economic benefits, they would simply send relevant members of the public ceaseand-desist letters or sue them without regard to whether copying may be
beneficial to the society at large. Faced with the threat of that kind, many
members of the public would simply stop copying works and further give up their
activities in cultural participation. Even if they opt not to stop, they may be
ordered by courts to pay the potential damages, the amount of which is usually
prohibitively high.
In fact, courts have actually rendered a large number of cases that have the effect
of condoning or even promoting those legal actions that filed by copyright holders
purely out of their maximization-of-economic-benefits impulses. For instance, it
has become trendy for courts to see transformative use of a work as presumptively
fair use. 88 Yet many courts have taken it for granted that nontransformative use of
a work may amount to an infringement of copyright. Against this backdrop, courts
repeatedly ruled that nontransformative use, including plain old photocopying
even in scientific or educational settings, is presumptively not fair use. 89
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Moreover, courts even ruled that any sampling from a sound recording,
presumably even a single note, infringes the copyright in the sampled recording. 90
4. Internal and External Safeguards
As shown above, there are ecological, economic and cultural manipulations
lurking in the current mode of copyright protection. Given the limit of space, I
pointed out only some of the major manipulative activities. Yet copyright law, as
I will demonstrate in the discussion that follows, contains neither the necessary
internal nor external safeguards that are strong enough to effectively deter those
manipulations. This further makes it necessary and urgent to introduce the public
trust doctrine into copyright adjudication and policy-making.
a. Internal Safeguards
Copyright law itself contains the internal safeguards aimed at preventing absolute
protection of private ownership. By and large, they carve out the limitations on
exclusive rights vested in creators. For example, the idea/expression dichotomy
dictates that it is the expression of ideas rather than ideas that is the subject matter
of copyright protection. 91 Moreover, copyright law is supposed to provide legal
protection in limited duration. Besides, the fair use doctrine allows the public in
general to use reasonable portions of works for purposes such as “criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.” 92 While these
internal safeguards do provide the necessary breathing room for the public to use
the knowledge and information contained in copyrighted works, they are in fact
not strong enough to curb the potential ecological, economic, and cultural
manipulations.
First, these internal safeguards do not set up any institutional limits on the
government’s power to privatize knowledge and information in the public space.
By and large, they act as the tool kit for the court to adjudicate the copyright
same intrinsic purpose as the original, thereby providing limited justification for a finding of fair
use.”); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, 166 F.3d 65, 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)
(finding that absence of transformative use in a case involving translation of news items weighed
heavily against fair use); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389
(6th Cir. 1996). Moreover, courts repeatedly held that nontransformative uses should be presumed
to cause market harm. This makes it unlikely for them to rule that nontransformative uses are not
infringing. See, e.g. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“Because, on the facts presented, [defendant’s] use of The Cat in the Hat original was
nontransformative, and admittedly commercial, we conclude that market substitution is at least
more certain, and market harm may be more readily inferred.”); Oasis Publ’g Co. v. West Publ’g
Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 929 (1996) (presuming the existence of because of nontransformative use);
Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB.
L.REV. 677, 716-17 (1995).
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disputes between private parties and to decide whether allegations against
infringements of copyrights should be upheld. On the other hand, these safeguards
are basically incorporated into copyright law by the legislature and used as the
tool kit to prevent protection of copyrights from being absolute. The legislative
body is by nature the drafter or codifier of these safeguards. Inevitably, absent in
these safeguards is the external institutional check on the legislative power to
examine the validity of the government’s decisions regarding the allocation of
informational resources. As shown in the discussion that follows, both the CTEA
and the DMCA were in fact adopted by the government without taking into
account their potential in seriously jeopardizing the role of these internal
safeguards in promoting free flow of information and knowledge.
Secondly, the recent unprecedented expansion of copyright protection, in fact,
was accompanied by the agendas aimed at significantly weakening the power of
those internal safeguards as the limitations on copyrights. For example, the CTEA
simply relaxed the mandate that the terms of copyright protection shall be strictly
limited. It opened the door for the potential extensions of copyright term as long
as the legislature sees fit. 93 Moreover, the DMCA’s rigid anti-circumvention
protection effectively renders the idea/expression dichotomy meaningless in the
digital age. 94 The DMCA confers up copyright holders a de facto right to restrict
access to their works, making it much harder for the public make fair use of works
in a meaningful way. Fair use presupposes that the public at large first have free
access to works and then make decisions regarding whether they need to make
fair uses. 95 Yet free access to works is no longer available for users because
technological measures deployed by copyright holders simply fence off them
from getting access to works and the DMCA furnishes penalties against
circumvention of those “digital fences”. Hence, the waning of the internal
safeguards furnishes larger room for copyright holders to maneuver so as to have
their manipulative activities organized to their advantage. It also further
demonstrates that these internal safeguards themselves lack the necessary
institutional check on the governmental power, which leaves the door widely open
for the government to bypass the principles embedded in those safeguards as they
see fit.
Thirdly, the internal safeguards’ inability to curb the manipulative activities
committed by copyright holders is further exacerbated by their inherent
indeterminacies. 96 For example, copyright law simply states that the
idea/expression dichotomy is a baseline principle for copyright protection. Yet it
93
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never ascertains and in fact it is exceedingly difficult to make sure what could be
seen as non-copyrightable “ideas” or otherwise as copyrightable “expressions”. 97
Accordingly, Judge Hand once lamented that “[n]obody has ever been able to fix
[the] boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can.” 98 Moreover,
the fair use doctrine, too, is actually fraught with a host of uncertainties. The
legislative history shows that Congress did not intend to shape the doctrine as
“bright-line rules” 99 for courts. Worse still, in the real world of practice, the courts
have developed inconsistent, and even conflicting, approaches to apply the
doctrine. 100 For example, with respect to whether the use of works is for
commercial purpose or not, the Supreme Court in Sony 101 and Harper & Row 102
held that any commercial use of works ought to be regarded as “presumptively
unfair.” Yet it ruled in Campbell to the contrary that commercial or
noncommercial character of a work “is not conclusive,” and this factor shall be
“weighed along with others in fair use decisions.” 103 Against this backdrop, the
multitude of indeterminacy problems inherent in those internal safeguards
definitely leaves a sizable gap within which the government or copyright holders
may maneuver to perform those manipulative activities. For example, as shown
above, media corporations and publishers routinely set up unreasonable
requirements for the public to obey, such as the specific number of words and
lines they can quote. 104 Worse still, the relevant members of the public are not
able to “fire back”, because they and even their lawyers are not sure whether their
use of works could be deemed fair by the court. Against this backdrop, the riskaverse public would choose not to challenge copyright holders before courts.
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b. External Safeguards
It is widely recognized that the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment set up a
check on the governmental power in granting proprietary control over
informational resources and thereby they together act as the external safeguards
against manipulative activities. Yet both of them can only target the state action
regarding allocation of informational resources. According to the state action
doctrine, they cannot directly constrain that private action that may cause a host of
manipulative problems as shown in the preceding section. 105
While the
government may abuse its power, copyright holders, as demonstrated in the
preceding section, still commit a series of manipulative activities which cannot be
effectively and adequately deterred by the internal safeguards embedded in
copyright law. Therefore, the external safeguard would simply turn a blind eye to
the manipulative activities committed by copyright holders as private actors.
Even though the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment can play its role as the
check on government power, they actually do not play a sufficiently strong role in
examining whether or not the government exercises its power in a manner
conducive to the promotion and protection of public interest. For the Copyright
Clause, it seems that it carries no active institutional check on the state action in
allocating informational resources. For instance, the Supreme Court has stated
that the Copyright Clause does not empower the judiciary to scrutinize whether
any state action in expanding copyright is valid under the Clause. “[The Court] is
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments
of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.” 106 Without
competent institutional check on the state power to allocate informational
resources, the Copyright Clause has instead become the ground on which the
legislature can enact law to strengthen copyright protection, which in effect
chiefly caters to the private interest of copyright holders and thereby brings about
marginal or no benefits for the public interest in learning and knowledge
sharing. 107
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Regarding the First Amendment, both free speech right and property right are
largely regarded as fundamental rights enjoyed by citizens. 108 This renders it
impossible for the free speech right to gain the necessary primacy over property
rights which surely include copyright. 109 Therefore, it follows that in allocating
information resources through enacting copyright law, the government may not
presumptively give primacy to free speech values over the need to protect
copyright. Moreover, courts have ruled that copyright can actually trump free
speech right in certain cases. For example, in treating copyrighted works as the
embodiment of creators’ speeches, Eldred held that the free speech principle
“bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s
speeches.” 110 On the other hand, there has been a widely-accepted assumption
that the internal safeguards such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine, function as the safety valves that make copyright law presumptively
compatible with the free speech values. From this perspective, it follows that
copyright law can generally pass the First Amendment muster.
III. REIMAGINING THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
IN COPYRIGHT LAW
In the preceding two Parts, I discussed the social justification for introducing the
public trust doctrine into copyright law. I argued that akin to the justification that
makes the doctrine fully-fledged in both environmental and property laws, we can
draw on the doctrine to promote and protect our intangible public space against
the backdrop that the recent copyright laws enacted by the state have produced an
enormous negative impact on the vibrancy of our cultural ecosystem. In particular,
I considered the potential role of the public trust doctrine in filling up the gap left
by the internal and external safeguards to counter the ecological, economic, and
cultural manipulations lurking in our cultural ecosystem.
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The conventional wisdom about copyright law, as demonstrated in the preceding
Part, harbors the complacency that either the internal or external safeguards can
effectively ward off a variety of manipulative activities in the area of copyright
protection. I pointed out that there is in effect no room for the complacency of
that kind. In the Part that follows, I will consider the legal foundation of the
public trust doctrine in copyright law and how courts can use the doctrine as a
legal tool to invite a set of new legal techniques so as to counter the manipulative
activities committed by the state or private actors to our cultural ecosystem.
Moreover, the set of legal techniques embodied in the doctrine, as I will explain,
is composed of three concrete elements: (1) defending the public’s collective
rights in public trust informational resources; (2) effectuating the government’s
political responsibilities through courts’ exercise of the judicial review power;
and (3) enforcing the copyright holder’s social responsibilities through the courts’
broadly looking at the need of public interests. As I will show, these legal
techniques can largely be borrowed from the judicial practices of the public trust
doctrine in protecting certain essential natural resources that form our public
space.
A. Defending the Public’s Collective Rights
1. Collective Rights in Public Trust Natural Resources
When invoking the public trust doctrine, courts repeatedly emphasize that the
doctrine by nature aims to protect the public’s rights to get access to or use of the
public trust resources, and every member of the public shall enjoy such rights on
equal terms. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court emphatically made the rightsbased statement as follows:
[The title to submerged lands] is a title different in character from that which
the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which
the United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and
sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty
of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private
parties. 111

Based upon the conventional rights of navigation, commerce and fishing
enunciated in Illinois Central, many state courts have expanded the scope of
public rights to cover recreational uses. For example, the Connecticut Supreme
Court first expressly recognized that the public trust rights protect a variety of
recreational activities including “boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish,
gathering seaweed, cutting sedge, and … passing and repassing” in the public
trust resources. 112 Generally speaking, there has been a solid recognition of the
right of recreational use in many states, such as California, 113 New Jersey, 114
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Washington, 115 Michigan, 116 etc. 117 Meanwhile, given the paramount importance
of ecosystem preservation, the public trust doctrine has been widely used to
protect the public right to environmental protection. 118
The rights protected by the public trust doctrine are by nature collectively held by
persons as members of the public. In this sense, they are not individual rights, but
rather collective rights. This is primarily because people acquire and enjoy the
bundle of public trust rights based upon their social membership in the public
space. Under the public trust doctrine, it is recognized that every member of the
pubic shares a stake in the public trust resources which form the tangible public
space. Therefore, the realization of the collective rights is indispensable for
cultivating human beings as social members and enhancing their interests in the
communal development. 119 By contrast, individual rights that protect private
property, personal privacy and so on, are bestowed upon persons primarily for the
purpose of promoting individual worth and dignity as human beings. 120 The
realization of individual rights is deemed to have intrinsic values to selfactualization and self-development.
Judging from the multitude of public trust doctrine cases, the collective rights
protected by the doctrine have two salient attributes. First, they are not divisible in
terms of how individuals can share the protected resources. Every member of the
public, from the letters and spirits of law, is equally entitled to have access to, and
make use of, the public trust resources which ranges from navigable waters,
114

Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323 (1984); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v.
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Glass v. Goeckel, 473 Mich. 667 (2005).
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Yet the Massachusetts and Maine Supreme Court refused to extend the public trust doctrine to
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California is generally seen as the first state to recognize the public’s right to environmental
protection under the public trust doctrine. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251(1971); National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419 (1983). All most all commentators maintain
that the public has the right to environmental protection under the public trust doctrine. See e.g.,
Sax, supra note 42; Klass, supra note 32; Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388 (supporting that the right to healthy
environment stems from the interaction of the public trust doctrine with the Ninth Amendment);
David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of
Private Property, supra note 17.
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JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 208 (1986) (arguing that collective rights protect
“interests of individuals as members of a group in a public good and the [collective] right is a right
to that public good because it serves their interest as members of the group”). See also, Lesie
Green, Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 315 (1991) (explaining
why collective rights should be viewed as rights to collective interests).
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For Kant, the protection of individual rights is based upon the premise that every human being
has autonomy and self-worth, and should be treated as an end rather than means. Thus, it reflects
the categorical imperative laid out by Kant: “all rational beings stand under the law that each of
them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends
in themselves.” IMMANUAL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (1997).
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submerged lands, to public squares and parks. People have equal entitlements in
this regard because they share collective interests in those resources. Collective
interests, in this context, are indistinguishable and unassignable shares of those
resources enjoyed by the people as members of the public. Put differently, the
public trust resources are by nature taken as an integral whole for members of the
public rather than divisible and discrete parts available to be used by any
particular persons. 121
On the other hand, the collective rights protected by the public trust doctrine are
not alienable in any circumstances. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court
enunciated a general rule governing allocation of public trust resources by
mandating that “control of the State for the purposes of the [public] trust can
never be lost.” Therefore, under this general rule, the government as the trustee of
natural resources shall never revoke the public’s collective rights and further trade
them away with the transferring of the public trust resources to private parties.
Moreover, the Supreme Court also laid down two exceptions to the general rule of
inalienability by prescribing that government can transfer the public trust
resources to private parties only if (1) they “are used in promoting the interests of
the public”; or (2) the transfer is made “without any substantial impairment of the
public interest.” 122 Therefore, these two exceptions show that the collective rights
in the public trust resources are not alienable even in the circumstances where the
government transfers the ownership of a resource to a private party. In other
words, given the inalienability of the collective rights, the public can still exercise
their rights in the privately owned public trust resources.
2. Collective Rights in Public Trust Informational Resources
The conventional mode of copyright protection, to a large extent, remains silent
on the legal status of the general public (users of copyrighted materials) in our
cultural ecosystem. While copyright law is replete with explicit itemizations of
the bundle of economic rights enjoyed by creators, it does not, as a routine,
expressly itemizes the bundle of rights that ought to be conferred upon members
of the public for them to assert collective interests in knowledge and information.
Not surprisingly, the conventional mode of copyright protection has given rise to
a widely-held mentality that sees securing adequate protection of economic rights
enjoyed by creators as the priority of copyright law. 123
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In Arnold v. Mundy, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick of New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that all
navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows and the coasts of the sea, including the water and
land under the water, are “common to all the citizens, and that each [citizen] has a right to use
them according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use ....” 6 N.J.L. 1,
93 (1821). In a recent water resource case, the Hawaii Supreme Court boldly affirmed that “the
public trust doctrine applies to all water resources, unlimited by any surface-ground distinction.”
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 135 (2000).
122
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-53.
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Harper & Row epitomizes the mentality that the core of copyright law is to protect authors’
economic rights. In this case, the Supreme Court held that that the defendant’s quotation of 300
words from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript of former President Gerald R. Ford could
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a. The Scope of the Collective Rights for the Public
The introduction of the public trust doctrine into copyright law would first help us
to counter the copyright holder-centered mentality, and further help us to think
about and ascertain the scope of rights that ought to be enjoyed by the general
public. For this purpose, I propose that akin to their public rights in certain natural
resources, the public shall be accorded with the following three general categories
of collective rights over public trust informational resources.
·The Right to Environmental Protection. The public has the right to have our
cultural ecosystem environmentally well-protected. 124 Any activities that cause
serious environmental pollution in our cultural ecosystem would violate this right
enjoyed by the public.
· The Right to Cultural Participation. The public has the right to fully
participate in the cultural life by freely expressing their opinions and engaging in
research and creativity activities. 125 The enjoyment of this right shall not be
unduly hampered by the government and private parties through tightening up
proprietary control over knowledge and information.
·The Right to Benefit from Technological Development. The public has the
right to enjoy the benefits from technological advances in communicating
knowledge and information. This right guarantees that technological advances of
that type could be encouraged and protected, and further requires that state should
ensure that the public has adequate access to these technologies. 126
not constitute fair use, even though the quotations related to a historical event of undoubted
significance for the public interest (the resignation and pardon of President Richard M. Nixon).
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557.
124
In addition to the support from the public trust doctrine, this right can further find its grounding
in Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration which states that “Man has the fundamental right to
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being.”
125
Similarly, this right can find a strong grounding in human rights law. For example, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights places much emphasis on the requirement that states
should allow citizens to enjoy full latitude in
“freely [participating] in the cultural life of the community.” UDHR, art. 27.1. In this sense,
cultural participation is the very realm of life that is free of unreasonable state surveillance,
interference, and coercion. Moreover, under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, states shall adopt various measures to “achieve the full realization of [the] right
[to cultural participation].” The measures include “those necessary for the conservation, the
development and the diffusion of science and culture.” Moreover, states shall “respect the freedom
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.” See, CESCR, arts. 15.2-15.3.
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This right is derived from the public right in navigable waters for navigation and commerce.
The public trust doctrine protects this right because it aims to ensure the public at large can
benefits from the openness of navigable waters for navigation and commerce. As the convenience
afforded by science and technology has become an indispensable part of human life, the right “to
share in scientific advancement and its benefits” has been enshrined in human rights treaties as
well. See, UDHR, art. 27.1; CESCR, art. 15.1 (b).
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b. The Nature of the Collective Rights for the Public
Apart from ascertaining the scope of the public’s rights in informational resources,
the public trust doctrine would further help us to rethink the nature of rights that
ought to be enjoyed by the public, and to generate new legal techniques to protect
the public’s rights. As a result, the use of the public trust of doctrine would lead to
a better-balanced approach to address many thorny issues that may arise in the
process of copyright adjudication or policy-making.
Similar to their rights over certain natural resources, the public’s rights over
informational resources are collectively held by the public at large, given that
every individual has a social membership in the cultural ecosystem of the
intangible public space. Moreover, the public’s collective rights are by nature
indivisible and inalienable. The indivisibility requirement entails that each public
member’s interest in informational resources is equally counted and inextricably
intertwined with one another. The prevention of one member of the public from
exercising his public rights would result in harming both his as well as other
fellow members’ interests in access to and use of informational resources. On the
other hand, the inalienability requirement generally mandates that the government
cannot trade away their rights over informational resources when it grants creators
with copyright in the informational resources concerned. Therefore, the
combination of the indivisibility and inalienability requirements prompts both the
government and the courts to vigilantly examine the impact of proprietary control
over informational resources on the realization of the public’s collective rights.
For the government, the public trust doctrine would mandate that it shall not grant
new exclusive rights or expand the existing exclusive rights for creators under the
circumstances that such decisions would purely give them greater economic
benefits while providing no or marginal benefits to the public at large. Therefore,
the government must take positive measures to fully examine and scrutinize the
impact of any proposed expansion of copyright protection on the public interest in
access to and use of informational resources.
Being indivisible and inalienable, the public’s collective rights protected by the
doctrine further require the courts to adopt a broad-based approach fully
sympathetic to the social values of public access to and use of informational
resources. To this end, courts need to go beyond the conventional wisdom which
teaches that the limitations on copyright are tailor-made to protecting relevant
users’ individual interest in informational resources. Put differently, the
conventional wisdom sees the limitations on copyright as only functioning to
protect the rights individually enjoyed by users of informational resources. The
fair use doctrine, for example, is conventionally recognized as the “affirmative
defense” available for a user to defeat a particular infringement claim alleged
against him or her. 127 Courts following this approach routinely examine only
127

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
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whether the interest of an individual user involved in the dispute should be
protected by the fair use doctrine. Rather, they rarely consider the extent to which
that individual party’s interest has any correlation with the interests of the public
at large. For example, in Harper & Row, the Supreme Court held that that The
Nation’s quotation of 300 words from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript
of former President Gerald Ford could not constitute fair use, even though the
quotations related to a historical event of undoubted significance for the public
interest. In rending such a decision, the Court did not examine the quotations per
se would produce any public benefits, say promoting democracy through
protecting the free flow of information and freedom of expression. Instead, the
Court seemed to focus on the impact of the unauthorized use on the market value
of the copyrighted work. 128 In particular, it concluded that “[i]t is fundamentally
at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that
are of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major premise
of copyright and injures author and public alike. ‘[To] propose that fair use be
imposed whenever the 'social value [of dissemination] . . . outweighs any
detriment to the artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of their
right in the property precisely when they encounter those users who could afford
to pay for it.’” 129
By hailing the “market value” factor as the “undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use,” 130 Harper & Row and its progenies 131 foreclosed
fair use by only weighing the individual interest/right in accessing and using
works against the copyright holder’s economic interest. This led Harper & Row to
ignore the fact that The Nation’s quoting 300 words of the Ford manuscript was in
effect vital to lending authenticity and understanding to its news reporting of the
historical event of the resignation and pardon of former President Richard Nixon.
To keep the public informed of the details of that historical event undoubtedly
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“furthered the public interest” 132 in “a broad dissemination of principles, ideas,
and factual information [that] is crucial to the robust public debate and informed
citizenry….” 133 In fact, the opinions rendered by Harper & Row and its progenies
share the same “market value” mentality with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, in which the Supreme Court invalidated regulatory taking of
landowner’s property on the ground that it caused “deprivation of all
economically viable use” of the property. 134 Yet such a justification based purely
on examining the “market value” factor or the economic injury to the property
owner was simply made without careful scrutinizing the fact that the regulatory
taking in question carried stronger public interest in preserving the natural
ecosystem in the beachfront areas. 135
As I pointed out in my early work, the Harper & Row-type judicial practice which
is based upon the notion that seeing fair use as an individual right, “would give
rise to the problem that [the public’s] rights are automatically ‘ranked’ lower than
copyrights” and “courts actually water down the importance of protecting public
interest.” 136 When dealing with those fair use cases, courts in fact barely took the
larger public interest into their account. This would lead to the serious
consequences that “[t]he progress of arts and sciences and the robust public
debate essential to an enlightened citizenry are ill served by this constricted
reading of the fair use doctrine.” 137
By contrast, the judicial practice of the public trust doctrine consistently shows
that courts have given priority to the considering of the values of the public
interest. Thus, it follows that courts should examine broadly the impact of a single
state or private action on the public interest at large. For example, the Hawaii
Supreme Court concluded that “any balancing between public and private
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purposes [shall] begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and
enjoyment.” 138
To promote and protect the three categories of collective rights enjoyed by the
general public, courts therefore need to alter their interpretive methodologies and
judicial techniques for adjudicating copyright cases, in particular for those fair use
cases. The public trust doctrine would require that when adjudicating copyright
cases, courts need to bear in mind that the public’s rights are by nature collective
rights rather than individual rights. This would require courts not to interpret the
fair use doctrine restrictively. Accordingly, sufficient consideration of the public
interest shall be made in the process of rendering judicial decisions. Rather than
fixing their focus on individual interest, courts shall look broadly to the spectrum
of public interests and their ramifications for public access and use of
informational resources. 139 For example, when interpreting the nature of fair
dealing exception which is similar to the fair use doctrine in U.S., the Canadian
Supreme Court in fact largely used the ethos of the public trust doctrine as
described above to promote the collective rights in informational resources
enjoyed by the public:
The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a
user’s right. In order to maintain the proper balance between the rights of a
copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively….
“Research” must be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure
that users’ rights are not unduly constrained…. “Dealing” connotes not
individual acts, but a practice or system. This comports with the purpose of
the fair dealing exception, which is to ensure that users are not unduly
restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted works. Persons or
138
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See e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses at 25, available at
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property consistent with the idea of free speech as democratic culture, there must be a robust and
ever expanding public domain with generous fair use rights. Intellectual property also must not be
permitted to create chokepoints or bottlenecks in the spread of knowledge and the distribution of
culture.”).
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institutions relying on the … fair dealing exception need only prove that their
own dealings with copyrighted works were for the purpose of research or
private study and were fair. They may do this either by showing that their
own practices and policies were research-based and fair, or by showing that all
individual dealings with the materials were in fact research-based and fair. 140

On the other hand, the public trust doctrine could also be used to counter the
general rule regarding the burden of proof that has been used by courts in dealing
with fair use cases. Court’s treating fair use as users’ individual rights and
consequently the affirmative defense for them has, as shown above, led courts to
routinely place on the defendant the burden of proof to demonstrate his act is in
line with the fair use doctrine. 141 The shifting of burden of proof, as it stands,
simply presumes that fair use is in fact “the right to hire a lawyer to defend [one’s]
right to create,” 142 unduly making it more costly and complicated for members of
the public to defend their rights. 143 Worse still, it also takes for granted that
copyright as an individual right should be given greater weight than the collective
rights enjoyed by the public.
By contrast, the ethos of the public trust doctrine, if applied to the fair use cases,
would require courts to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff, namely the copy
holders especially those big entertainment and publishing companies. 144 Through
140
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dispute.”); Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, H.R. Rep. No. 102-836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 n.3
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type of relief sought by the copyright owner….”).
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The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.” See LESSIG, supra note 142., at 187.
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Pamela Samuelson also points out that in fair use cases the burden of proof shall in general be
placed on the copyright holders:
Given the important role that fair use plays in mediating tensions between copyright law
and the First Amendment and other constitutional values, it would be appropriate for the
burden of showing unfairness to be on the copyright owner. When deciding whether to
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shifting the burden of proof, courts would show that their following the ethos of
the public trust doctrine requires them to give appropriate primacy to the rights
collectively enjoyed by the public and to the promotion and protection of public
interest. In this sense, it is the possibility that collective rights enjoyed by the
public could potentially gain primacy over the individual right in copyrighted
works that provides the ground of shifting the burden of proof to the copyright
holders. Moreover, the shifting of the burden of proof in this regard would further
open the door for courts to engage in a more expansive scrutiny of the subtleties
and nuances of the public interest that could be promoted, should the plaintiff’s
copying of works is to be upheld as fair use. Besides, it would encourage
members of the public to assert their rights more actively and spontaneously
rather than simply succumb to copyright holders’ demands for licensing fees. This
is because the shift of the burden of proof would significantly reduce their costs to
participate in litigations and make it quicker to settle disputes so that their
activities would not be unduly hampered by the exceedingly complex, lengthy and
costly litigation process.
B. Effectuating the Government’s Political Responsibilities
1. Political Responsibilities Regarding Public Trust Natural Resources
Under the public trust doctrine, the government has the trustee power to regulate
or dispose of natural resources. Meanwhile, the government is required by the
doctrine to fulfill its political responsibility to promote and protect the public’s
collective rights over certain natural resources. For example, it has been
repeatedly emphasized that the government has “the right and the duty to protect
and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not
derive from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people.” 145
To ensure that the government would fulfill its political responsibilities, the public
trust doctrine confers upon courts the judicial review power to consider the
validity of government’s state action in allocating the protected resources.
According to the judicial practice, courts examine whether or not the
government’s allocation of public trust resources is made for the purpose of
promoting public interests. For example, with respect to navigable waters and the
land underneath them, the Supreme Court in Illinois Central stated that “The
challenge a use as infringement, rights holders often anticipate that fair use will be at
issue in the case, and they are typically in a better position than defendants to offer
proof on key issues pertinent to fair use, such as the likelihood of harm to the market.
See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses at70, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323834.
I am grateful to Ng-Loy Wee Loon for directing me to Pamela Samuelson’s latest thought about
the rule of the burden of proof in the fair use cases after she read an earlier draft of this article.
145
In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (1980). National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 441 (Cal.,1983) (“[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation
of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the
state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands,
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is
consistent with the purposes of the trust.”).
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control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except [that
resources] are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining.” 146 Accordingly, if the results of state action cannot live up
to the standard of review enunciated in Illinois Central, courts would invalidate
the government’s decisions regarding allocation of public trust resources, and
would denounce its “abdication” 147 of the political responsibility to protect the
public’s collective rights.
The judicial oversight of the state action regarding its allocation of public trust
resources, in effect, empowers the court to overturn the decisions made by the
government as the representative of the public at large. Anti-majoritarian as it is,
the public trust doctrine as the basis of the judicial review power is legitimized by
its role in remedying “the tyranny of the minority” problem that may arise in the
democratic decision-making process. The conundrum inherent in the modern
democracy, as Carl Schmitt observed, is that political institutions as the venue for
deliberating public good may have been transformed into the institutions for
powerful interest groups to negotiate and bargain for commercial deals of power
distribution. Those powerful interest groups, routinely formed by large business
organizations, are the “minority” parties in the society when compared to the
public as the “majority” whose collective interest are supposed to be of central
importance in democratic governance. Yet these “minority” groups are able to
drastically reduce the inclusive deliberation in the legislative and administrative
process to the business meeting concerning the distribution of interests among
them. Because they wield an unparalleled wealth of resources, these “minority”
groups are extremely active in penetrating the structure of democratic deliberation
by controlling some or most of the representatives of the public, such as senators,
governors, etc. When these representatives become their “loudspeakers” in the
political decision-making process, the democratic deliberation would degenerate
into “an empty formality” and “superfluous decoration” 148 for the public interest
at large. Their conduct, in Carl Schmitt’s opinion, is no longer “concerned with
discovering what is rationally correct, but with calculating particular interests and
the chances of wining and with carrying these through according the one’s own
interests.” 149
The state action regarding allocation of natural resource is indeed very vulnerable
to the “tyranny of the minority” problem as discussed above. Given that public
trust resources have enormous market value, any proprietary control of them
would surely generate windfall profits for any private parties. Not surprisingly,
146
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this gives rise to the rent-seeking activities150 that may be aggressively pursued by
the private parties with strong economic clout. 151 Through bribing or lobbying
governmental officials in power, these parties take possession of a public trust
resource. On the other hand, the public at large is always diffuse and unorganized.
It is relatively hard to get them organized as a concerted voice to take part in the
government’s decision-making process associated with the allocation of public
trust resources. Too often, the public at large is simply unable to wage struggle to
counter the powerful rent-seeking activities performed by large corporations.
Based upon the public trust doctrine, the exercise of the judicial review power by
courts plays an important role in preventing or altering the state action of
allocating natural resources which has been skewed by rent-seeking activities. As
Sax insightfully observed, the public trust doctrine “is a technique by which
courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative
process.” 152 To do so, the doctrine empowers the courts to “promote equality of
political power for [the] disorganized and diffused [public as the] majority”
whose interest is easily jeopardized by the “self-interested and powerful
minorities [who] often have undue influence on” governmental resource
management. 153 Therefore, courts derive and legitimatize the judicial review
power from the need to protect the public’s collective rights against the tyranny of
the minority that may occur in the process of government’s allocating of public
trust informational resources.
2. Political Responsibilities Regarding Public Trust Informational Resources
With respect to copyright protection, the law-making process regarding the
allocation of informational resources does suffer from the “tyranny of the
minority” problem intensified by the rent-seeking activities as well. Legislative
bodies, by and large, have been heavily lobbied and persistently controlled by the
major copyright-based industries, which primarily include entertainment
corporations, publishers, and collective management organizations. 154
In the digital age, informational resources increasingly have higher market value.
To a large extent, they are the lifeblood of any knowledge-based economies. Akin
to the situation in natural resources, the increased value in having ownership of
informational resources has been driving more and more corporations in the
copyright-based industry to persuade the legislature into adopting laws that
provide stronger copyright protection. Against this backdrop, the relevant
150
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industries first negotiate the deals to protect their interests and then forge a
coalition to bring them to fruition in Congress. They hire experts to draft
legislative proposals aimed at amending law to beef up copyright protection. They
further send lobbying representatives to present eloquently to members of
Congress how useful and reasonable their proposals are. The prevailing presence
of the copyright-based industry in the legislature process has persistently led to
increased protection of copyright, making them have stronger power to tighten up
the flow of informational resources. The scope of the exclusive rights that control
access to and use of information contained in works of authorship has been
increasingly enlarged. At the same time, however, the legislature has kept
narrowing down the limitations on those exclusive rights which give room for the
public to use information contained in works. 155
The legislative expansion of copyright protection, however, has been made
without much consideration of its social costs to public access to and use of
informational resources. In many cases, the legislative proposals submitted by the
representatives form the relevant copyright-based industries were overwhelmingly
adopted by Congress without much close scrutiny over their impact on public
interests. “Much legislation advances the agendas of private interest
groups.…Congress in effect agreed that if the industry representatives would
invest the time and energy to develop a bill that all of them endorsed, Congress
would refrain from exercising independent judgment on the substance of the
legislation.” 156 In this one-sided process, legislators were preoccupied with the
rhetoric that the stronger copyright protection would necessarily give copyright
holders stronger economic incentive to produce and disseminate works, resulting
in increased amount and availability of works for the public. Such rhetoric,
however, has only been touted by the industry representatives. Legislators
routinely shy away from interrogating whether stronger protection would bring
about either stronger economic incentive to produce works or substantial benefits
for the public. Therefore, it is not surprisingly that legislative expansions of
copyright “often consist of outright congressional rubber-stamping of industrydrafted legislative and committee reports.” 157
The expanding of exclusive rights as well as the narrowing of copyright
limitations, without a doubt, has an enormous impact on the public’s access to and
use of informational resources. Yet the public at large has failed to have their
concerns voiced in the law-making process and to further have them seriously
scrutinized by legislators. This is primarily because the public, akin to their
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circumstances in the government’s decision-making process regarding allocation
of natural resource s, is too diffuse and unorganized to launch backlash against
excessive expansion of copyright protection. Also, as laymen of copyright law,
the majority of the public are prone to take it granted that copyright expansion
does not have much to do with them. Too often, the public at large is
unfortunately not aware of the ramifications of copyright expansions for their
interests even after the relevant law is adopted. 158
Among numerous amendments to copyright law, the Copyright Term Extension
Act epitomizes the fact that the law-making process has been one-sidedly
dominated and skewed by the copyright-based industries. 159 Throughout its
legislative history, the Congressional hearings were persistently dominated by
pro-copyright testimonies. As a result, the CTEA was adopted on the basis of
these testimonies. 160 Indeed, it become evident that the “tyranny of the minority”
problem that exists in the government’s allocation of natural resource, has
plagued the copyright lawmaking as well. Against this backdrop, courts can and
should act as the guardian for the public to question whether government has
fulfilled its political responsibilities regarding allocation of informational
resources. 161 To this end, they can rely on the public trust doctrine to urge the
government to engage in open and rational process of democratic deliberation,
when they proceed to allocate informational resources through enacting copyright
laws.
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To excise the judicial review power, courts could examine the substantive and
procedural aspects of the state action in allocating of informational resources. For
the substantive value, they could rely on the standard of review used by Illinois
Central to determine whether the government has fulfilled its political
responsibilities. To this end, courts need to consider whether the government’s
granting of stronger proprietary control over informational resources would
benefit the public or cause substantive harm to the public interest. 162 Moreover,
the doctrine shifts the burden of proof to the government, requiring it to
demonstrate the strong public-interest purpose in granting stronger copyright
protection. At this juncture, the shift of the burden of proof compels the
government to disclose the potentially hidden details concerning how and why
informational resources in question have been privatized or afforded with stronger
proprietary protection.
Second, in terms of the procedural issues, courts could examine whether the
adoption of copyright laws has adequately taken into account the interests of
major stakeholders through open and fair procedures. 163 To this end, the court
could consider whether decisions are made with a great deal of public notice so as
to keep the public reasonably informed and give them sufficient time to get
prepared and organized to respond and counteract. In particular, the doctrine
further requires that the legislative body must take accommodative measures to
have the representatives of the public closely involved in the law-making process.
For example, legislative body may invite civil society organizations such as
Public Knowledge, Electronic Frontier Foundation, etc, to present their concerns
for the impact of any proposed new laws on the public interest in access to
information. Therefore, courts can strike down the law enacted without close
participation by the representatives of the public, or order the legislature to revise
the law by actively having those representatives adequately engaged in the
legislative process.
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C. Enforcing the Copyright Holders’ Social Responsibilities
1. The Property Holders’ Social Responsibilities
Apart from acting as the check on state action, the public trust doctrine also
constrains private action under the circumstances in which the public needs must
be accommodated in the privately controlled resources. On the one hand, courts
have invoked the doctrine to order opening of private property to accommodate
public access and use. In this circumstance, courts routinely ascertain that public
access to or use of the relevant private property is the condition on which the
public can meaningfully exercise their collective rights over trust resources. In
courts’ opinion, without taking any accommodative measures for the public,
property owners would seriously impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the
collective rights of the public. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
acknowledged that “[e]xercise of the public’s right to swim and bathe below the
mean high water mark may depend upon a right to pass across the upland beach.
Without some means of access the public right to use the foreshore would be
meaningless.” 164 Hence, the Court ruled that the public must be afforded with
both access to and use of privately-owned upland beach (dry sand areas) as
reasonably necessary for them to exercise their public trust right to bathe or swim
in the foreshore areas.
On the other hand, under the public trust doctrine, the private parties who
obtained ownership of pubic trust resources from the government are required to
accommodate public access to and use of those resources in their proprietary
control. Under this circumstance, the private ownership conferred by the
government is seen as a bifurcated title. On the one hand, the party has acquired
private ownership over the resource concerned. This title of ownership, under the
common law, is recognized as jus privatum. Yet the title is subject to the public’s
collective rights over the resources concerned. On the other hand, the common
law regards the public’s collective rights over public trust resources as jus
publicum protected by the state. 165 The bifurcated title over the privatized public
trust resources shows that while the government can alienate public trust
resources on appropriate occasions, it must not give up and abdicate the
responsibilities to protect public interests in those resources. Despite the
government’s alienation of public trust resources, the public therefore can still
exercise their rights over those privately controlled resources obtained from
164

Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323 (1984). Moreover, in an earlier case the
court also stated that “A modern court must take the view that the public trust doctrine dictates
that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.”
Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309 (1972).
165
See e.g. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 US 1,11 (1894) (holding that “the title, jus privatum, in
[tidelands] … belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is
vested in him, as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit”); Appleby v. City of
New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (ruling that the ownership of submerged lands carrying both the
jus publicum and the jus privatum); Glass v. Goeckel, 473 Mich. 667, 680 (2005) (“Jus publicum
refers to public rights in navigable waters and the land covered by those waters; jus privatum, in
contrast, refers to private property rights held subject to the public trust.”).

46

government’s privatization schemes. 166 For example, regarding the littoral rights
granted by the government, courts repeatedly held that “although the state retains
the authority to convey lakefront property to private parties, it necessarily conveys
such property subject to the public trust.” 167
By requiring the public accommodation in private property, the public trust
doctrine, in fact, imposed upon property owners both negative and positive social
responsibilities. For the negative responsibility, the doctrine requires that private
property owners not to use their property in a manner harmful to the public for
them to exercise their collective rights under the public trust doctrine. In fact, the
imposition of negative responsibilities reflects a long-recognized principle that
“all property … is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it
shall not be injurious to the community” 168 and other individuals. 169 For instance,
in Orion Corp. v. State, Orion Corporation, the owner of 5,600 acres of Padilla
Bay tidelands in Washington attempted to dredge and fill Padilla Bay to create a
residential community. Yet the court held that Orion’s purchase of the tidelands
was subject to the public trust and must accommodate the public need, given that
the state could not give up jus publicum interest for all the citizens. Hence, Orion
Corporation has the responsibility not to carrying out dredging and filling of the
tidelands at issue that “would substantially impair the public rights of navigation
and fishing, as well as incidental rights and purposes [for boating, swimming,
water skiing].” 170 Similarly, filling of tidal waters was also invalidated by
Palazzolo v. State 171 based on the public trust doctrine. Moreover, courts have
also held that private owners have the responsibility not to erect fences on their
properties, which would prevent the public from exercising the right to walk on
the lake shores below the ordinary high water mark 172 or to navigate in the lake
waters. 173
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With respect to the positive responsibility, private property owners are required
by the public trust doctrine to take on certain set of tasks to facilitate the public’s
exercising of their collective rights. For instance, given that access to and use of
dry sand areas are indispensable for the public to make recreational use of the
foreshore areas, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered that private property
rights was required to afford the public not only “reasonable access to the
foreshore” but also “a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.” 174
2. The Copyright Holders’ Social Responsibilities
Given that the core of the conventional copyright law is the protection of creators’
economic rights, the law per se is largely silent on whether copyright holders have
social responsibilities. The designing of copyright law, therefore, inculcates a
popular mentality in copyright holders that armed with the bundle of economic
rights protected by copyright law, they nevertheless do not have any social
responsibilities after the publication of their works. Hence they reason that they
have fulfilled their social responsibilities through publishing their works and
thereby informing the public of their intellectual creations. It then naturally
follows that as long as they finish the acting of publishing, they do not have any
further social responsibilities whatsoever regarding the protection of their
copyrights. For them, copyright simply denotes the Blackstonian notion of
property, in which the owner enjoys “sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe.” 175
Moreover, Eldred v. Ashcroft lends a strong support for the Blackstonian notion
of property that divorces exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright holders from the
social responsibilities that they should have. In Eldred, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that social responsibilities are imposed upon right holders as a quid
pro quo for vesting them with patent rights. 176 Yet, it rejected that the same
conclusion could be applied to copyright. In doing so, the Court based its denial
on the distinction between the protections afforded to copyright and patent:
We note [that] patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange,
and that our references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the patent
context . . . . [C]opyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge.
A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she
acquires from her reading. The grant of a patent, on the other hand, does
prevent full use by others of the inventor’s knowledge. 177

Without carefully reconsidering the nature of copyright and recent legislative
overhaul that may change the landscape of copyright protection, the Court’s
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ruling against the requirement of social responsibilities is dubious. With the recent
expansion of copyright protection, it is not necessarily true that the protection
afforded to copyright holders, according to the letters of copyright law, does not
enable them to monopolize any knowledge. For example, it was bluntly pointed
out in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade that “the fact that computer programs are
distributed for public use in object code form often precludes public access to the
ideas and functional concepts contained in those programs, and thus confers on
the copyright owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional
concepts.” 178 Moreover, the Court failed to bear in mind that retroactive extension
of copyright terms and legal protection of technological measures 179 and nonoriginal databases 180 actually confer monopoly over ideas upon right holders.
The use of the public trust doctrine would provide us with a vantage point to think
about why social responsibilities should be imposed upon copyright owners, and
further how the social responsibilities could be enforced by copyright law. The
core idea for courts is to think about the relationship between the copyright
owners and the public at large. First and foremost, borrowing from the techniques
of the public trust doctrine, courts could consider the imposition of social
responsibilities on copyright holders based upon the fact that they need to provide
public accommodation in order to promote and protect the public’s collective
rights. 181 On the one hand, despite the right to exclude vested in copyright holders,
the public access to and use of the works concerned may constitute the condition
on which members of the public can exercise their collective rights in a
meaningful way. As Rebecca Tushnet has convincingly demonstrated, “copying is
of value to audiences who have access through copying to otherwise unavailable
speech. It also enhances copiers’ ability to express themselves; to persuade others;
and to participate in cultural, religious, and political institutions.” 182 Therefore,
courts must examine whether the public at large, if their copying of works is not
allowed, can still exercise their rights protected by the public trust doctrine in a
meaningful way.
On the other hand, given that copyright law now affords quasi legal protection
over ideas and facts through the law of anti-circumvention regulations, courts may
rely on the public trust doctrine to consider the imposition of social
responsibilities upon right holders concerned in order to facilitate the public’s
178
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exercising of rights over those ideas and facts under their control. Unquestionably,
ideas and facts are not subject to proprietary control and copyright protection.
Rather, they remain in the public space freely available for the public to use. If the
government affords quasi copyright protection over certain elements of ideas and
facts through anti-circumvention regulations or any other forms of copyright
protection, courts may hold that the relevant copyright owners shall have the
responsibility to accommodate the exercise of public trust rights over the ideas
and facts concerned.
By and large, to consider copyright holders’ social responsibilities would provide
us with a new insight into thinking about the nature of copyright in general and
the copyright limitations like the fair use doctrine in particular. The use of the
public trust doctrine in this regard broadens our vision of the nature of copyright
through postulating that “social responsibility is the very quid pro quo for
granting a bundle of exclusive rights to [copyright holders].” 183 In this sense, we
do not see the function of copyright law as merely granting economic rights to
creators or securing adequate copyright protection for them. Rather, copyright law
also plays an essential role in making it effective that creators with copyright
protection would contribute to the promoting of the public interest in improving
accumulation and dissemination of knowledge and information and further in
enhancing social creativity and innovation in the economic and cultural
development of our human society. Moreover, with the use of the public trust
doctrine, we do not simply see the fair use doctrine as merely carving out
limitations on copyrights vested in creators. Rather, the fair use doctrine should be
seen as a useful tool to impose social responsibilities upon copyright holders and
to further enforce the social responsibility of that type. From this perspective, the
fair use doctrine makes it legally effective that copyright holders would exercise
their rights in a manner conducive to the promotion and protection of the public’s
collective rights over informational resources. As I argued in my earlier work, the
fair use doctrine, if seen from the perspective of social responsibilities, actually
becomes one of the institutional arrangements aimed at sustaining and enhancing
the reciprocal relationship between copyright holders (creators) and the general
public (users):
According to the principle of reciprocity, as long as users act in a manner
respectful of copyright, creators should and must be required to do something
positive to the promotion and protection of users’ rights. In this sense, the grant
of copyright to creators therefore intrinsically entails the social responsibilities
imposed upon them. Put differently, users can thereby forcefully petition
creators to exercise their rights in a manner conducive to the pursuit of public
good. From this perspective, copyright holders are required to come to terms
with the socially beneficial use of their works by the public at large. Under
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certain circumstances, they are further required to facilitate such kind of use of
copyrighted works. 184

Yet it does not necessarily follow that courts should invoke the public trust
doctrine in adjudicating every case to examine whether copyright holders have
social responsibilities to take measures aimed at accommodating the public. This
mode of adjudication may cause many conventional copyright doctrines
dysfunctional in dealing with private law suits. Instead, with respect to the
copyright holders’ responsibilities, courts should use the public trust doctrine
merely as a last resort. Only in the circumstances where courts face hard cases
and find it very difficult to make a decision even after using all of conventional
doctrinal tools can they start to invoke the public trust doctrine. In this context,
courts can draw on the public trust doctrine to consider whether the copyright
holder have social responsibilities to the public. If so, courts can then rule that the
copyright holder owe responsibilities to the defendant given that he or she is
presumptively to be a member of the public. In this scenario, the dispute could be
resolved on the basis of courts’ reasoning of the extent to which social
responsibilities should be imposed on copyright holders.

IV. REEGINEERING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE THROUGHT PRACTICE AND
APPLICATIONS
Based on preceding discussion about the theories and concrete techniques of the
public trust doctrine, I will consider how the doctrine could be applied to create
new alternative ways to deal with the copyright cases which are core to the
healthy development of our cultural ecosystem.
A. Overturning Eldred
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the recent
twenty-year extension of copyright terms. On the one hand, the Court held that
the extension was rationally made within the ambit of Congress’ legislative power,
because the past term extensions were unanimously deemed valid and Congress
demonstrated legitimate policy judgments for the latest term extension, such as
the need to keep up with the term extension in European Union, to provide
economic incentive to produce and disseminate new works and so on. 185
Therefore, it ruled that the enactment of the CTEA did not violate Copyright
Clause. On the other hand, the Court held that the CTEA does not violate the First
Amendment, because it did not change the contours of the idea/expression
184
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dichotomy and the fair use doctrine as the so-called “built-in First Amendment
accommodations” in copyright law. 186
The use of the public trust doctrine, however, would render a judicial opinion that
runs direct counter to Eldred and invalidates the enactment of the CTEA. Given
that the CTEA’s extension of copyright terms would necessarily grant proprietary
control over public trust informational resources (without the extension, they
would have remained in public trust), the Supreme Court can rely on the public
trust doctrine to exercise its judicial review power to consider whether the CTEA
is valid or not.
Following the doctrine, the Court first needs to examine whether the substantive
public values have been infused into the CTEA. To this end, the Court could
examine whether the term extension promotes public interest or whether it does
not cause any substantial impairment of the public interest. As show in Part III,
this is the threshold inquiry required by Illinois Central and many other public
trust doctrine cases. 187 First, judging from the CTEA’s legislative purpose, the
Court could conclude that its extension of copyright terms was adopted for purely
benefiting the copyright holders, especially those big entertainment companies. 188
As the Senate Report and the majority of testimonies delivered at the
Congressional hearings show, it is evident that the major purpose of the CTEA
was to provide increased economic benefits to copyright holders. 189 Moreover,
the Court could further consider whether the CTEA would substantively impair
the public interest. At this juncture, the Court could find that the CTEA would
hardly provide most of creators more incentive to produce and disseminate more
works for the public, because it is dubious that their decision-making process
would take into account the extra twenty-year protection as a motivation for
acting in that way. Instead, the Court could find that the CTEA may cause grave
social harms. For example, many economists have estimated that the CTEA
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the summary of testimonies, see Karjala, supra note 160, at 206-222.
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would give rise up to monopoly control of information and thereby increase “the
social cost of monopoly.” 190
On the other hand, the Court needs to further consider whether the CTEA was
adopted in line with the procedural requirements under the public trust doctrine.
To this end, it needs to make sure that the CTEA’s legislative process adequately
involved stakeholders or representatives for the public and Congress further
seriously considered their opinions. The legislative history, however, clearly
shows that Congress actually failed to do so. This is because testimonies delivered
before Congress were predominantly from the copyright-based industry or the
pro-copyright camp, and the enactment of the CTEA was in fact based entirely
upon their opinions. 191
B. Google Book Search Project
By and large, the Google Book Search Project “create[s] a comprehensive,
searchable, virtual card catalog of all books.” 192 It helps people to find new books
and locate the particular information they need in the relevant books. Also, it
makes available to the public the books that are not protected by copyright yet are
on longer in print (publishers have no economic interest to circulate them).
Google, however, was sued for copyright violation due to the fact the project
basically involves unauthorized verbatim copying of copyrighted works. It seems
highly uncertain whether the project itself could constitute fair use of works. This
is largely because it would be exceedingly hard for the court to decide whether the
project may affect copyright holders’ marketing of similar digital library services,
and whether Google’s online indexing of books can be counted as transformative
use of works. 193 Faced with the risk of losing in court and the severe negative
impact of nearly endless litigation process that may affect its project, Google
reached a private settlement with the plaintiff. 194
190
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Generally speaking, the use of the public trust doctrine can work as a reasonable
alternative to save the Google project which is hailed as almost an equivalent to
invention of the printing press. 195 Apart from being a check on governmental
power, the doctrine, as I demonstrated in the preceding Part, also sets up
restrictions on private action performed by copyright holders. To do so, it imposes
social responsibilities on them. As mentioned above, it is very difficult for the
court to decide whether the Google project is fair use or not. Against this
backdrop, the court could use the public trust doctrine as a last resort to consider
whether copyright holders have the responsibilities to accommodate public access
to and use of their works through the Google project.
On the one hand, copyright holders may have the responsibility to accommodate
the public to exercise their collective right to cultural participation and right to
benefit from technological advances. Through the digital technologies advanced
by Google, the public at large is enabled to obtain “basic bibliographic
information” about the works and the “search term” they want to locate or
pinpoint in the works as well. These are basically the informational resources held
in public trust and are not subject to copyright protection. Having access to and
use of them are of essential importance for the public to enjoy their rights. For
example, the project promotes the right to cultural participation by greatly
facilitating researchers and teachers to locate the information they need. It also
promotes the right to benefit from technological advances by making it easily for
the public to locate those informational resources by digital technology. Yet
verbatim copying done by Google is necessary to help them enjoy these rights in a
meaningful way. Without it, the public at large cannot use this sort of digital
technology to locate the informational resources they need. Meanwhile, the court
should also note that Google project has taken an adequate level of restraint
measures in order to prevent or minimize the potential harm to the copyright
holders. For example, it only shows a few snippets to the public, displays
copyright notice, and provides links that directs the public to the venues where
works are available to be purchased.
On the other hand, copyright holders may the responsibility to accommodate the
public to exercise their collective right to environmental protection in our cultural
ecosystem. Digital technology opens up a myriad of unprecedented opportunities
to archive all of works by digitizing them. It facilitates and enhances
environmental protection in our cultural ecosystem because it would greatly
reduce the cost for the public to use works and enormously enriches the diversity
195
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of works that could be made available to the public. 196 From this perspective,
copyright holders are required to get involved in the digital technology-based
protection of our cultural ecosystem and ought to fulfill this responsibility by
allowing digital archiving that is being carried out by the agent, such as Google.
Yet, given that Google is a for-profit organization, the court may require it to
donate a reasonable portion of its revenues earned from the project to the non-forprofit public interest organizations, or to reasonably compensate copyright holders
as a reward for their involvement in the project.
CONCLUSION
By and large, the public trust doctrine resonates strongly with Justice Holmes’
view that law is “the felt necessities of the time.” 197 As many courts and leading
commentators have observed, the doctrine is by nature “to be molded and
extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to
benefit.”198 In this Article, I have demonstrated that because there are ecological,
economic and cultural manipulations that have arisen amid wide use of new
technologies in the digital age, we do need to expand the use of the public trust
doctrine from natural resources to knowledge and information flowing in our
intangible public space. The use of the public trust doctrine, as I have shown,
would function to counter those manipulations that have posed a severe threat to
our cultural ecosystem, in which all of us have a stake as social members of the
public space. Through curbing those manipulations, the doctrine would defend the
public’s collective rights and enforce both the government’s political
responsibilities and the copyright holder’s social responsibilities.
Yet the expansion of the public trust doctrine into copyright law would give rise
to the concern that it might afford too much power to the judiciary and thereby
might unduly disrupt the check-and-balance structure in our democratic system.
Indeed, this is a legitimate concern. 199 But when we take a closer look at the
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building blocks of the doctrine, it is easy to find that courts use the doctrine for
the public interest and their exercising of the judicial review power actually stems
from the necessity of defending the public’s collective rights. 200 In the context of
copyright law, the past decade has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of
copyright protection spawned by the legislature. Yet the one-sided legislative
process which has been dominated chiefly by the copyright-based industry also
gives rise to the concern that such mode of expanding copyright protection is in
fact socially unsound and has seriously disrupted the check-and-balance structure
in making copyright law aimed at accommodating various social needs through
democratic discourse and procedure-channeling. The use of the public trust
doctrine, by and large, would function to defend the public’s collective rights and
to correct the undemocratic problem in making copyright through empowering the
court to act as a check on the power of the legislative branch. In this sense, the
doctrine has the potential of restoring the check-and-balance structure in making
copyright law as a social institution that mediates and reconciles the competing
interests in privately owing and publicly using informational resources in the
digital age.
It is true that nothing can be perfect. Any institutional design, to a larger and
lesser degree, carries defects. The public trust doctrine and the court’s role in
defending the public interest are no exceptions. This is a fact that we have to
come to terms with. Yet the court has indeed played an indispensable role in
taking the initiative in breaking suppressive barriers to justice and freedom in dark
time of crisis. 201 A court in England invalidated the monopoly in trade granted by
Queen Elizabeth I dating far back to late sixteenth century. 202 In the new
millennium, it was again the Supreme Court who liberated homosexuals from the
homophobia inherent in anti-sodomy laws, 203 and resoundingly denounced the
deprivation of Guantánamo detainees’ constitutional right to challenge their
detention in American courts. 204 These crises have the resonance with Rousseau’s
caveat: “Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on
public affairs, and abuse of the laws by the Government is a lesser evil than the
corruption of the Lawgiver….” 205 Indeed, all these crises, together with the
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environmental crisis in our natural and cultural ecosystems, clearly reveal the high
stakes of the potential manipulative power wielded by interest groups and
legislatures. From this perspective, it is high time for courts to use the public trust
doctrine as a doctrinal tool to actively respond to the unprecedented
environmental crisis in our cultural ecosystem.
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